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DISCRIMINATION BASED ON HIV/AIDS AND OTHER HEALTH
CONDITIONS: "DISABILITY" AS DEFINED UNDER FEDERAL
AND STATE LAW*
DAVID W. WEBBER, J.D.**
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INTRODUCTION
For many years, the development of legal protections against dis-
crimination based on health conditions has been a public health and
social justice legislative goal. The inclusion of individuals with Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) within such non-discrimination pro-
tections has been an integral part of this process. The critical prob-
lem in developing an effective non-discrimination legal standard,
however, has been in establishing the scope and contours of this stan-
dard-what health conditions are or are not to be included? The def-
inition of protected health conditions must be capable of reasonable
comprehension for compliance purposes, while also being specific
enough to allow effective interpretation and enforcement in the ad-
ministrative agencies and the courts.
Beginning with the enactment of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,1
federal legislative efforts have been directed at the development of a
statutory definition of disability? that requires something more than a
* Portions of this Article appeared in an earlier form in Disability Discrimination in
America: H1V/AIDS and Other Health Conditions, 281 JAMA 745-52 (1999), copyright 1999,
American Medical Association. This Article is an outgrowth of the HIV Law & Policy Study:
A Project of the Federal Legislation Clinic, Georgetown University Law Center, supported
by the HenryJ. Kaiser Foundation. The authors are grateful to Timothy M. Westmoreland,
LL.B., project director, to the national experts in law and public health that attended three
project meetings on the implications of the Supreme Court's ruling in Bragdon v. Abbott,
and to James Hodge, Jr.,J.D., LL.M., for research direction and Deborah Reichmann, J.D.,
M.P.H., for research assistance on the state law summary.
** J.D., Temple University. David W. Webber is the editor of AIDS AND THE LAW (3d
ed. 1997).
*** Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; Professor, Johns Hopkins
School of Hygiene and Public Health; and Co-Director of the Georgetown/Johns Hopkins
Program on Law and Public Health.
1. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-
796i (1994)).
2. Although the original enactment of the Rehabilitation Act used the term "handi-
cap," this paper uses the preferred term "disability" throughout. The latter terminology
was approved in the Americans with Disabilities Act as well as other federal statutes provid-
ing protection against discrimination on the basis of health conditions. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102 (1994).
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health condition of a trivial or inconsequential nature. At the same
time, however, the condition cannot be so serious or severe as to
render the individual wholly unable to participate in the program, or
to work in the workplace, in question.' Also, because the conditions
to be protected cannot reasonably be listed, given their variable na-
ture in individuals and the need to allow for identification of addi-
tional health conditions in the future, the disability definition is
generic in nature, without listing, even for illustrative purposes, any
specific health condition as a disability. Although nondiscrimination
laws at the state and local levels include some notable deviations from
this federal definition, the federal definition has been widely influen-
tial in the development of non-discrimination standards at the state
level.
HIV infection presents a fundamental question about the extent
of protection afforded by this definition. Understanding in what
sense this health condition is a disability-it presents no apparent lim-
itations on everyday activities-is invaluable in comprehending the
meaning and purpose of federal disability nondiscrimination law
more generally and assessing alternative approaches, such as those
presented by some state laws. In this Article, we examine the disability
definition "problem" from the standpoint of HIV infection, specifi-
cally HIV infection in its "asymptomatic" phase. By definition, this
phase of the infection does not involve physical limitations or impair-
ments of the sort that are frequently viewed as resulting in disability.
Although our discussion focuses on asymptomatic H1V infection, it
should be noted that infection with HIV may result in differing assess-
ments of disability at different times for different individuals. Diagno-
sis with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), for example,
has been taken to be the sine qua non of a disability under the federal
definition, yet "AIDS" is nothing more than a diagnostic definition
established by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) for epidemiological purposes.4 Although the diagnosis can be
based on one or more physical symptoms, the diagnosis does not re-
3. For a critical assessment of the disability definition used in federal law, see Robert
L. Burgdorf Jr., "Substantially Limited" Protection from Disability Discrimination: The Special
Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of Disability, 42 VILL. L. REv. 409, 415-34
(1997).
4. See generally Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1993 Revised Classification
System for HIV Infection and Expanded Surveillance Case Definition for AIDS Among Adolescents
and Adults, 41 MoRBmIDIT & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 1, 1-19 (RR-17, 1992). The definition
has gone through four revisions since its original promulgation in 1982. For a fuller dis-
cussion of the AIDS definition, see AIDS AND THE LAw § 1.6, at 12-13 (David W. Webber
ed., 3d ed. 1997 & Supp. 1999).
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quire a specific degree of physical or mental limitation or impairment.
Indeed, one can be diagnosed with AIDS based solely on laboratory
evidence of suppressed immune system function combined with one
or more clinical conditions. Subsequent to diagnosis, however, an in-
dividual's immune system function may return to normal levels and
the clinical conditions may resolve. Therefore, because an individual
diagnosed with AIDS may currently have no symptoms, such an indi-
vidual may face much the same problem in establishing a disability as
would an individual who has never had symptoms of the infection.
On the other hand, infection with HIV may in some individuals have a
profound psychological impact, which may be disabling. Thus, as we
explore in more detail below, determining whether someone is an in-
dividual with a disability under the federal definition has little depen-
dence on the medical nomenclature used to label the individual's
health condition.
We begin by summarizing the need for federal nondiscrimination
standards offering protection for individuals with HIV. We then pro-
vide a brief discussion of the definition of disability under the result-
ing legislation, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).'
We summarize the early judicial and administrative views of the ADA
as protecting individuals with HIV. We next turn to judicial interpre-
tation of the ADA in cases in which that understanding has been dis-
puted, including, most notably, the Supreme Court's attempt to
answer the question in its seminal HIV case, Bragdon v. Abbott,6 as well
as the Court's subsequent interpretations of the ADA definition. We
then discuss the results of a fifty-state survey of HIV-specific statutes, as
well as more general state disability statutes. In our survey, we provide
a descriptive and analytical discussion of these laws, offering our views
as to whether they provide protection independent of federal provi-
sions. An appendix to this paper provides a table summarizing signifi-
cant features of these laws, and a separate compilation provides a
state-by-state summary of their disability definition as it relates to HIV
infection.
I. SOCIAL AND POLmcAL BACKGROUND
From the earliest moments of the Human Immunodeficiency Vi-
rus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS) epidemic
there emerged an alliance among public health and community-based
5. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 706, 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101-12102, 12111-12117, 12131-12134, 12141-12150, 12161-12165, 12181-
12189, 12201-12213 (1994)).
6. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
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organizations emphasizing the importance of effective legislation
prohibiting discrimination. Every major government,7 medical,' pub-
lic health,9 legal, 10 and civil liberties 1 organization to issue a report
on the epidemic condemned discrimination. The Presidential Com-
mission on the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic in 1988
was particularly insistent about the transcending importance of fed-
eral legislation to safeguard against invidious discrimination:
As long as discrimination occurs, and no strong national pol-
icy with rapid and effective remedies against discrimination
is established, individuals who are infected with HIV will be
reluctant to come forward for testing, counseling, and care.
This fear of potential discrimination ... will undermine our
efforts to contain the HIV epidemic and will leave HIV-in-
fected individuals isolated and alone.
12
Although the emphasis on a federal legislative remedy for HIV-based
discrimination in the ADA was no doubt a result of the view that state
nondiscrimination standards were, at least in some jurisdictions, inad-
equate, l" the need for nondiscrimination standards was felt in some
localities to be sufficiently urgent that some states and municipalities
adopted HIV-specific protections before action was taken on the fed-
eral level. Los Angeles, as the west coast epicenter of the epidemic,
for example, was in 1985 the first municipality to adopt an HIV-spe-
cific nondiscrimination law.' 4 In contrast, non-discrimination protec-
7. See, e.g., Centers for Disease Control, Public Health Services Guidelines for Counseling
and Antibody Testing to Prevent HIV Infection and AIDS, 36 MoRIiDrrY & MORTALITY WEEKLY
REP. 509, 514 (1987).
8. See, e.g., American Medical Association Board of Trustees, Prevention and Control of
Acquired Immunodeiciency Syndrome: An Interim Report, 258JAMA 2097, 2101-02 (1987); INsTr-
TUTE OF MEDICINE, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, CONFRONTING AIDS: DIRECTIONS FOR
PUBLIC HEALTH CARE AND RESEARCH 19 (1986).
9. See, e.g., ASSOCIATION OF STATE AND TERRITORIAL HEALTH OmCIALS, GUIDE TO PUB-
Lic HEALTH PRACTICE: AIDS CONFIDENTIALITY AND ANTI-DISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLES 11
(1988).
10. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, POLICY ON AIDS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 4 (1989); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, AIDS COORDINATING COMMITTEE, AIDS: THE
LEGAL ISSUES 2 (1988).
11. See, e.g., ACLU AIDS PROJECT, EPIDEMIC OF FEAR: A SURVEY OF AIDS DISCRIMINATION
IN THE 1980s AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE 1990s 1-3 (1990).
12. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS
EPIDEMIC 119 (1988).
13. See H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 2, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 47, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(104 Stat. 303) 329 (noting "[t]oo many States, for whatever reason, still perpetuate confu-
sion" regarding nondiscrimination standards).
14. See Los ANGELES MUNICIPAL CODE § 45.80 (1985), available at <http://Ci-
tyfolio.ci.la.ca.us/cgi-bi. . .9680}&softpage=Document42&x=19&y=12> (visited Feb. 28,
2000).
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tion based on HIV status was first introduced in Congress in 1987 but
not adopted until enactment of the ADA in 1990.1'
Recommendations for anti-discrimination legislation relied on
three justifications-discrimination violates basic tenets of individual
justice, damages the economic and social fabric of America, and weak-
ens the nation's abilities to prevent and treat HIV/AIDS.
Discrimination based on an infectious condition is just as inequi-
table as discrimination based on race, gender, or other health condi-
tion. In each case, people are treated inequitably, not because they
lack inherent ability, but solely because of a status over which they
have no control. Complex and often pernicious mythologies develop
about the nature, cause, and transmission of disease. As the Supreme
Court has recognized, "society's accumulated myths and fears about
disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical limita-
tions that flow from actual impairment. Few aspects of a handicap
give rise to the same level of public fear and misapprehension as con-
tagiousness. '16 Persons living with HIV/AIDS have to endure not only
archaic attitudes that they present a health threat, but also moral dis-
approval of their behavior. The fact that HIV/AIDS is associated in
the public consciousness with traditionally disfavored groups-gay
men, injection drug users, and commercial sex workers-only height-
ens the concern about prejudicial treatment.
Discrimination against persons living with HJV/AIDS is economi-
cally and socially detrimental. By rendering talented individuals un-
employable or uninsurable or by impairing their ability to secure
housing or receive health care or other services, discrimination tears
at the social and economic fabric of the nation.
Finally, discrimination undermines public health efforts to iden-
tify infections, prevent transmission, and provide care and treatment
for persons living with the HIV disease. The public health strategy is
to encourage the population to be tested, to educate the population
to avoid risk behaviors such as unprotected sex and the sharing of
drug injection equipment, and to provide opportunities for humane
care and effective treatment for all persons infected with HIV.17 From
the beginning, it has been clear that if individuals fear the personal,
15. For a more detailed history of congressional consideration of HIV nondiscrimina-
tion standards, see AIDS AND THE LAW, supra note 4, § 3.6 (3d ed. 1997).
16. School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987) (footnotes omitted).
17. See generally, COMMISSION ON AIDS RESEARCH & THE BEHAVIORAL, Soc. & STATISTICAL
SCIENCES, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SOCIAL IMPACT OF AIDS IN THE UNITED STATES 23-43
(Albert R. Jonsen & Jeff Stryker eds., 1993) [hereinafter SOCIAL IMPACT OF AIDS IN THE
UNITED STATES].
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social, and economic consequences of being diagnosed with HIV/
AIDS, they may forego testing, fail to discuss their health and risk be-
haviors with counselors or health care professionals, and refrain from
entering the health care system for treatment. Consequently, the
need for law reform to protect against discrimination emerged as one
of the most important public health strategies in the early years of the
epidemic.
The social, economic, and public health effects of the HIV/AIDS
epidemic in the 1980s 18 set in motion a series of events that would
lead to enactment of the most significant civil rights legislation since
the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.19 A coalition of organi-
zations and people committed to the rights of persons with HIV/AIDS
and persons with other disabilities formed to seek federal legislation
designed to proscribe discrimination.2'
II. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
The Americans with Disabilities Act became the federal anti-dis-
crimination law that had been so widely and earnestly sought. The
National Commission on the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome,
in 1991, applauded the passage of the ADA: "The landmark Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act (ADA) is a significant step toward protecting
the rights of all disabled Americans, including people with HIV dis-
ease. The passage of the ADA with the inclusion of protections for
people with HIV disease is a victory worth celebrating." 21
The heart of the ADA is the prohibition, in varying contexts, of
discrimination against individuals with a real or perceived disability.
Yet the ADA does not identify any specific health conditions as disabil-
ities; there is no statutory listing, whether exclusive or inclusive, of
disabilities. Instead, in an effort to ensure broad and flexible cover-
age, the ADA includes a general definition of what constitutes a disa-
bility. This statutory approach is the result of both practical and
political considerations. As a practical matter, an adequately inclusive
listing of health conditions that results in a finding of disability may
well be impossible to formulate. The formulation of such a listing,
18. See id.
19. See Chai R. Feldblum, Medical Examinations and Inquires Under the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act: A View from the Inside, 64 TEMPLE L. REv. 521, 521-22 (1991).
20. See Chai R. Feldblum, The (R)evolution of Physical Disability Anti-discrimination Law:
1976-1996, MENTAL & PHYVSICAL DISABILTIES L. REP. 613, 617 (1996); Feldblum, supra note
19, at 523-31. See also SOCIAL IMPACT OF AIDS IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 17.
21. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME, AMERICA LIv-
INC WITH AIDS 113 (1991).
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dependent as it would be on specialized medical and scientific knowl-
edge, is certainly not an undertaking appropriate for the legislative
process.22 As a political matter, adoption of a generic definition
avoided the problem of considering, comparing, and deciding
whether or not to include competing health conditions. At the same
time, advocates for legal protection for individuals with disabilities
were able to form a successful political coalition that asserted far more
influence on the legislative process than would have been possible
had advocates for each specific health condition been acting alone.
The ADA thus eschews the approach of previous legislative proposals
that would have singled out one health condition or another, such as
21 24HIV infection23 or cancer, for protection. So while the generic defi-
nition was a legislative success as a result of coalition politics, all indi-
viduals with disabilities, including individuals with HIV, are faced with
the necessary task, then, of establishing that their health condition
meets the generic statutory criteria.
According to the ADA, a disability is a physical or mental impair-
ment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of
an individual, or a record of such impairment, or being regarded as
having such an impairment.2 This definition applies throughout the
ADA. Thus, cases concerning the meaning of disability that arise
under Title I (employment) are equally applicable to Titles II (public
services) and III (public accommodations). The ADA provides, first, a
definition of actual disability: an impairment, physical or mental, that
imposes a substantial limitation on a major life activity. 6 Second, an
individual who has a record of such an impairment is protected, even
though the record refers to an impairment in the past which is not
22. Congress might have delegated the responsibility of formulating such a listing, con-
sistent with the generic definition enacted by statute, to the administrative agencies re-
sponsible for enforcement of the statute. To a degree, those agencies have sought to
provide a more detailed definition in their regulations and interpretative guidance. While
the Supreme Court deferred to the Department of Justice's view that HIV is a disability
under the ADA in Bragdon v. Abbott, in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139
(1999), the Court held that Congress had not delegated any authority to the enforcement
agencies to interpret the statutory definition. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2145.
23. See AIDS Federal Policy Act of 1987, S.1575/H.R. 3071, 100th Cong. (1987) (pro-
posing nondiscrimination for individuals with HIV); 133 Cong. Rec. 21,903 (1987) (text of
Senate bill as introduced).
24. See, e.g., Barbara Hoffman, Employment Discrimination Based on Cancer History: The
Need for Federal Legislation, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 1 (1986) (advocating enactment of the Cancer
Patients Employment Rights Act, H.R. 1294, 99th Cong. (1985)).
25. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).
26. See id.
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currently a disability.27 Third, under the "regarded as" prong of the
definition, it is unlawful to discriminate against an individual based on
the (mis)perception that the person has a disability.2 8 Persons dis-
criminated against because of their association with a person with a
disability infection are also protected,29 as are persons retaliated
against because of their opposition to discrimination.3" In addition to
the ADA, the same definition of disability is included in two other
federal nondiscrimination laws, which are more limited in scope than
the ADA but nevertheless provide significant protection against disa-
bility-based discrimination: the Rehabilitation Act of 197331 and the
Fair Housing Act.1
2
As the foregoing discussion makes clear, the ADA does not explic-
itly mention HIV. Yet after the ADA's enactment, there existed a
sense of complete assurance that strong federal protection was now in
force to protect persons at all stages of the disease, ranging from pure
asymptomatic HIV infection through to CDC-defined AIDS. This
sense of assurance was informed by an understanding of the social
and legislative history that gave rise to the ADA, guidance provided by
the executive branch, and the interpretation of the statutory defini-
tion by the judiciary.
Given the social and political forces that led to the ADA, it is not
surprising that there existed a widely held view that the law covered
persons living with HIV/AIDS. The HIV/AIDS community, as we
have suggested, played a powerful role in enactment of the legislation,
and these groups gave no sign of discontent with the coverage pro-
vided in the statute. Indeed, among legal commentators on the sub-
ject, dissent on this point was virtually nonexistent. 33
27. This protection is similar to the laws in some states that protect against discrimina-
tion based on an individual having a record of HIV testing, as discussed in the text accom-
panying notes 156-161 and 180-182.
28. See42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(c) (1994).
29. See 42 U.S.C. § 112(b) (4) (1994) and § 12182(b) (1) (E) (1994); Finley v. Giacobbe,
827 F. Supp. 215, 219-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
30. See 42 U.S.C. § 12203; Sherer v. Foodmaker, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 651 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1994).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h) (1994).
33. See Gary Lawson, AIDS, Astrology, and Arline: Towards a Causal Interpretation of Section
504, 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 237 (1989) (arguing against HIV as a disability under § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act); cf William G. Buss, Educating Children with Human Immunodeficiency
Virus, in AIDS AND THE LAw § 4.10, at 125 (2d ed. 1992) (noting that conclusion that
asymptomatic HIV infected individuals are covered under section 504 and the ADA is per-
suasive but not inevitable); William G. Buss, Human Immunodeficiency Virus, the Legal Mean-
ing of "Handicap, " and Implications for Public Education Under Federal Law at the Dawn of the Age
of the ADA, 77 IOWA L. REV. 1389 (1992) (same).
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Throughout the consideration of the ADA during the 101st Con-
gress, protection from discrimination for persons with HIV infection
was a stated objective. 4 President Bush, in urging passage of the
ADA, did so on the basis that it would protect individuals with AIDS
and HIV infection from discrimination.35 The Senate version of the
ADA, S. 933, was referred to the Committee on Labor and Human
Resources, which considered the issue of HIV infection as a disabil-
ity.36 The House version, H.R. 2273, was introduced in four commit-
tees, two of which considered the issue of HIV infection as a disability
under the ADA: the Committee on Labor and Education3 7 and the
Committee on the Judiciary.38 All legislative reports that addressed
the issue concluded that HIV infection is an impairment under the
ADA and apparently assumed that the impairment caused by HIV sub-
stantially limits one or more major life activity. Furthermore, most of
the congressional consideration of HIV focused on the issue of
whether HIV, as an infectious disease, should be treated differently
from other disabilities under the ADA. Attempts by critics of the pro-
posed ADA to exclude persons with infectious or communicable dis-
eases from coverage were unsuccessful, which again emphasizes
congressional intent in extending protection.39 If HIV infection was
not viewed by Congress as a health condition included under the pro-
posed definition of disability, there would have been no reason to at-
tempt to include such a communicable disease exception. Similarly, it
34. This discussion of the legislative history of HIV in regard to the ADA is derived
from AIDS AND THE LAW, supra note 4, § 3.6 (3d ed. 1997 & Supp. 1999).
35. See Bush Endorses Protections for H1V-Positive Contained in Americans with Disabilities Act,
DAILY LAB. REP., Mar. 30, 1990, at A4 (urging passage of ADA "that prohibits discrimination
against those with HIV and AIDS").
36. See Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1989, S. REP. No. 106-116, at 8 (1989). See also statements upon Senate approval, 135
CONG. REc. S10,789 (statement of Sen. Kennedy); 135 CONG. REc. S10,794 (statement of
Sen. Moynihan); 135 CONG. REc. S10,800 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen.
Simon).
37. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 51 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,
333 [hereinafter House Labor Report].
38. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28 n.18 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N
445, 451 n.18 [hereinafter House Judiciary Report] (citing approvingly 1988 Department
ofJustice memorandum for conclusion that individuals with HIV infection have an impair-
ment that substantially limits a major life activity and thus are disabled).
39. See 136 CONG. REc. H4613 (daily ed.July 12, 1990) (statement of Rep. Dannemeyer
in opposition to coverage of persons with communicable diseases); House Judiciary Commit-
tee Begins Markup of Bill to Prohibit Bias Against Disabled, DAILY LAB. REP., May 2, 1990, at A9
(House Judiciary Committee rejection of amendment offered by Rep. Dannemeyer to ex-
clude homosexuals infected with HIV from coverage under the ADA). Debate on H.R.
2273 was limited in the House under H. Res. 394, 101st CONG. (1990), and thus the gen-
eral question of whether individuals with infectious diseases should be covered by nondis-
crimination standards was not be debated.
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is notable that the debate in Congress on the question of whether
food service workers with communicable diseases in general, and HIV
in particular, should be protected from employment discrimination
resulted in floor votes on that question in both the House and the
Senate.4° Again, such votes would not have been necessary if Con-
gress did not believe it was enacting a law that protected individuals
with HIV. Perhaps even more significantly, the ADA's disability defini-
tion is adopted from the Rehabilitation Act, which at the time of con-
gressional consideration of the ADA was widely viewed as including
individuals with HIV infection within its protection. Congress indi-
cated that the ADA is to be read in light of existing standards under
the Rehabilitation Act.41 Indeed, both the House42 and Senate4" re-
ports on the ADA approved the Department of Justice's Office of
Legal Counsel memorandum, which concluded that a person infected
with HIV is covered under the first prong of the definition of the term
disability because of a substantial limitation to "procreation and inti-
mate personal relationships."44 In essence, Congress appears to have
considered H1V as a per se disability in enacting the ADA. This view
of the legislative history has been acknowledged by the courts that
have considered the question.45
A. Executive Branch Interpretation of the ADA
The administrative agencies charged with enforcing the ADA, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the De-
partment ofJustice (DOJ), both concluded that the statute covered all
stages of HIV infection. The EEOC's interpretive guidance, recogniz-
ing the unique social history of the disease, sets HIV apart from other
disabling conditions. "Some impairments," the EEOC states, "may be
disabling for particular individuals but not for others, depending on
40. For a fuller discussion of the "food handling" controversy during congressional
consideration of the ADA, see AIDS AND THE LAw, supra note 4, § 3.6, at 112-17.
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (1994). See also House Labor Report at 52, reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 304.
42. See House Labor Report at 52, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 334 (citing ap-
provingly a 1988 U.S. Department ofJustice opinion that HIV infection is a disability under
the Rehabilitation Act because of substantial limitation on procreation and intimate sexual
relationships); House Judiciary Report at 28-29, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 451.
43. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 22 (1990).
44. Memorandum of Douglas Kamiec, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Legal Counsel, Dep't of Justice, to Arthur B. Culvahouse, Jr., Counsel to the President
(Sept. 27, 1988), reprinted in DAILY LAB. REP., Oct. 7, 1988, at Dl.
45. See United States v. Happy Time Day Care Ctr., 6 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1078 (W.D. Wis.
1998) ("the legislative history behind the ADA indicates that lawmakers understood that
the act would cover anyone infected with HIV").
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the stage of the disease or disorder.... Other impairments, however,
such as HIV infection, are inherently substantially limiting."4 6 The
Department of Justice explicitly includes "HIV disease (symptomatic
or asymptomatic)" in its regulations and interpretive guidance as a
disability. The DOJ notes: "The phrase 'symptomatic or asymptom-
atic' was inserted in the final rule after 'HIV disease' in response to
commentors who suggested the clarification was necessary."
4 7
B. Lower Courts' Interpretation of the Disability Definition
Early judicial opinions similarly presumed, virtually without ex-
planation, that the federal disability definition covered persons with
asymptomatic HIV infection.48 Certainly, this appeared to be the case
with respect to the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the precursor to
the ADA. Parmet and Jackson note:
As an initial matter, every reported decision from the mid-
1980s up until the passage of the Americans with Disabilities
Act in 1990 determined that both AIDS and, when
presented, asymptomatic HIV infection constituted disabili-
ties .... In fact, it took only a few years for an overwhelming
judicial consensus to develop that HIV-and AIDS-infected
individuals were properly protected by existing disability dis-
crimination statutes.49
The broad consensus established in Rehabilitation Act jurisprudence
continued after the ADA's enactment. The early cases continued to
see the question of whether asymptomatic HIV infection was a cov-
ered disability as a settled matter.5 °
The unquestioned consensus on coverage of persons with asymp-
tomatic HIV infection began to crumble in the mid-1990s, just as the
first advancements in the treatment of HIV disease were becoming
reality. Emphasizing the ADA's requirement for an "individualized
determination, " " a concept thoughtfully endorsed by the Supreme
46. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.20) (1999).
47. U.S. Department of Justice, ADA Title II Interpretive Guidance, 28 C.F.R § 35.104
(1999).
48. See, e.g., Ray v. School Dist., 666 F. Supp. 1524, 1532-33 (M.D. Fla. 1987) (noting
HIV infection but absence of symptoms of AIDS in Rehabilitation Act case.).
49. Wendy E. Parmet & DanielJ. Jackson, No Longer Disabled: The Legal Impact of the New
Social Construction of HIV, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 16-17 (1997).
50. See, e.g., Robinson v. Henry Ford Health Sys., 892 F. Supp. 176, 180 (E.D. Mich.
1994); Howe v. Hull, 873 F. Supp. 72, 78 (N.D. Ohio 1994); T.E.P. v. Leavitt, 840 F. Supp.
110, 111 (D. Utah 1993).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1994)
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Court in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,52 courts began to criti-
cally question the premise that asymptomatic HIV infection automati-
cally qualifies as a disability. In particular, the Fourth Circuit ruled
that not only is HIV infection not a disability under the ADA5 -the
infection is not even an impairment.54 In another case in which there
was no dispute that the plaintiffs son was infected with HIV, the
Fourth Circuit noted that "[t] here is no evidence in the record before
us that [the plaintiffs son] is impaired, to any degree, or that he cur-
rently endures any limitation, yet alone a substantial limitation, on any
major life activity." 55 In yet another case, a federal district court ruled
that HIV infection is not a disability for a plaintiff on the basis that his
infection imposed no substantial limitation on a major life activity.56
Cases of this sort raised the question of when and under what circum-
stances an individual with HIV can invoke the protections of the ADA.
C. The Supreme Court's ADA Disability Definition Decisions
Beginning in its 1997-98 term, the Supreme Court issued the first
of a series of decisions defining the protections afforded by the
ADA.5 7 In Bragdon v. Abbott, the Court held that a woman with asymp-
tomatic HIV infection is an individual with a disability.5" In that case,
a dentist, Dr. Bragdon, refused to fill a dental cavity of an HIV-in-
fected patient, Sidney Abbott, in his office on the basis of her HIV
infection. 9 Ms. Abbott then brought suit alleging that the refusal vio-
lated the Title III public accommodation provisions of the ADA.60 Dr.
Bragdon conceded that his professional office was covered by the
ADA, but argued that the plaintiff, who did not have symptoms of HIV
illness, was not an individual with a disability under the ADA.61 Addi-
tionally, he argued that providing services to the infected patient, be-
52. 480 U.S. 273, 287-88 (1987).
53. See Runnebaum v. NationsBank, 123 F.3d 156, 174 (4th Cir. 1997).
54. See id. at 168. The Supreme Court's decision in Bragdon v. Abbott implicitly over-
ruled Runnebaum. See infra notes 58-71 and accompanying text.
55. Ennis v. National Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 60 (4th Cir. 1995).
56. See Cortes v. McDonald's Corp., 955 F. Supp. 539, 54647 (E.D.N.C. 1996).
57. In addition to the four cases directly involving the definition of disability under the
ADA discussed infra notes 58-93 and accompanying text, the Supreme Court has to date
issued two other rulings construing that statute. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections
v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998) (holding that the ADA is applicable to state prisons); Olm-
stead v. L.C., 524 U.S. 581 (1999) (holding that the ADA requires residential placement in
least restrictive environment).
58. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631 (1998).
59. See id, at 629.
60. See id,
61. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 939 (1st Cir. 1997).
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cause of the risk of HIV transmission, would pose a direct threat to his
health.6 2 Bragdon, however, did not present the question of whether
Ms. Abbott was regarded by Dr. Bragdon as having a disability under
the third prong of the ADA disability definition.
The Court's ruling that Ms. Abbott was an individual with a disa-
bility had three bases. First, her HIV infection imposed a substantial
limitation on one of her major life activities-reproduction.6 3 Sec-
ond, the Court relied on the ADA's own construction clause, which
requires that it be interpreted to provide no less protection than "the
standards applied under the Title V of the Rehabilitation Act... or
the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant" to that Act.64
Third, the Court ruled that judicial deference, under the doctrine of
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,65 is due to
the Department of Justice's views that individuals with asymptomatic
HIV infection are covered by the ADA.6 6
While the Court's ruling that Ms. Abbott's HIV infection was an
impairment that imposed a substantial limitation on one of her major
life activities was adequate to dispose of the appeal, the Court never-
theless adduced the two additional arguments in favor of the conclu-
sion that HIV is a disability. Thus, while stating that it was not
reaching the issue of whether HIV is a per se disability under the
ADA, the Court in effect held that it was. Furthermore, it should be
noted, the Court did not state that HIV is not a per se disability, simply
that it need not reach that issue, despite its grant of certiorari on that
question. 67 As a result, Bragdon contains an internal tension. Plain-
tiffs with HIV must be prepared to plead and prove a disability. At the
same time federal agency interpretations, to which the courts owe def-
erence, dictate that HIV is "inherently disabling," and the ADA by its
own language, by incorporating Rehabilitation Act standards, requires
62. Discussion of the Supreme Court's ruling on the direct threat issue, see 524 U.S. at
648-55, is beyond the scope of this Article. On remand, however, the First Circuit Court
ruled that Dr. Bragdon's evidence of direct threat was "too speculative or too tangential
(or, in some instances, both) to create a genuine issue of material fact" and affirmed sum-
mary judgment in favor of the plaintiff Sidney Abbott. 163 F.3d 87, 90 (1st Cir. 1998)
(quoting Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 948 (1st Cir. 1997)).
63. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 639.
64. Id. at 631-32 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12201 (a) (1994)).
65. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Where Congress has not explicitly asked an administrative
agency to clarify a statutory provision by regulation, the necessity of agency guidance may
be implicit. See id. at 844. "In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction
of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an
agency." Id. This provides agency guidance roughly the same weight as administrative
regulations, which are reviewed using an arbitrary and capricious standard. See id.
66. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 646.
67. See id at 641-42.
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nothing less than the conclusion that HIV is a disability. The view that
HIV infection is a per se disability also obviates the logical inconsis-
tency that results from determining disability based on actual limita-
tions imposed by the infection. Why should some individuals, such as
Ms. Abbott, be able to prevail on their claim that they have an ADA
disability because of limitations on reproduction, while others, such as
a child with HIV who is denied access to dental care, cannot invoke
the ADA's protection when the underlying health condition is the
same for both? As we suggest below, there may be other major life
activities than reproduction and sexual relations that are substantially
limited by HIV infection. But whether one or another major life activ-
ity is limited by HIV is not a function of HIV as a health condition
itself, it is often a function of the individual's age, personal choices,
and other factors independent of HIV.
This view of Bragdon-that it establishes, sotto voce, H1V infection
itself as a disability-is consistent with the views expressed by the
lower federal courts in the year after Bragdon. On remand from the
Supreme Court, for example, the First Circuit noted that "earlier
phases of this litigation established that asymptomatic HIV constitutes
a disability under the ADA."68 The Eighth Circuit similarly cited Brag-
don for the proposition that HIV is a disability under the ADA.69 The
Second Circuit cited Bragdon for the view that HIV is a disability under
the analogous provisions of the Rehabilitation Act.7 ° Only the Fifth
Circuit, however, took a narrower, more literal, view of Bragdon, inter-
preting it as holding that HIV inherently limits certain major life activ-
ities, but not ruling on HIV as a per se disability.
7 1
One year after its ruling in Bragdon, the Supreme Court issued a
trio of decisions construing the ADA's application to the workplace.
First, in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,72 the Court answered a question
not reached in Bragdon by holding that corrective or remedial meas-
ures are to be taken into account in determining whether an individ-
ual has a disability as defined by the ADA.73 In Bragdon, the Court
concluded that even with mitigating measures, Ms. Abbott neverthe-
less had a disability, and thus the issue need not be reached.7 ' But in
Sutton, the Court rejected the interpretation of the EEOC and DOJ,
68. Abbott v. Bragdon, 163 F.3d 87, 88 (1st Cir. 1998).
69. See Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 156 F.3d 825, 831 n.5 (8th Cir. 1998).
70. See Rivera v. Heyman, 157 F.3d 101, 103 (2d Cir. 1998).
71. See Deas v. River West, L.P., 152 F.3d 471, 478 n.15 (5th Cir. 1998).
72. 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999).
73. See id. at 2145.
74. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 640-41 (1998).
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which both had concluded that the individual's impairment should be
assessed without regard to any corrective or remedial measures, as un-
supported by the plain text of the ADA itself.75 Then, in Murphy v.
United Parcel Service, Inc.,76 and Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg7v the
Court applied Sutton to similarly conclude that, taking into account
mitigating measures, the plaintiffs did not have disabilities as defined
by the ADA.78
As noted above, Bragdon took the mitigating effects of medication
into account in determining whether Ms. Abbott's impairment im-
posed a substantial limitation on her major life activity of reproduc-
tion.79 The Court identified two independent ways in which HIV
imposed that limitation: first, the risk of HIV transmission to the indi-
vidual's sexual partner (the Court cited studies indicating a risk from
twenty to twenty-five percent for male partners of HIV-infected wo-
men), 80 and, second, the risk of HIV transmission to the child during
pregnancy and childbirth (the Court referred to an eight percent risk
of transmission).81 Thus, even taking into account the effects of medi-
cation in mitigating the limitation imposed by Ms. Abbott's HIV infec-
tion, she was nevertheless found to have a substantial limitation. 2
The Court's view of administrative agency interpretations of the
ADA as expressed in Sutton is also pertinent. First, the Court found
that the EEOC's regulation that mitigating measures should not be
taken into account was without support in the statutory language and
thus invalid.8 3 Perhaps more significantly, however, the Court noted
that "no agency has been delegated authority to interpret the term
'disability"' 84 as it appears in the ADA's definition section.8 5 Never-
theless, the Court noted that "[b] ecause both parties accept these reg-
ulations as valid, and determining their validity is not necessary to
decide this case, we have no occasion to consider what deference they
are due, if any."86 The significance of the conclusion that no agency is
authorized by Congress to interpret the term "disability" in the ADA is
unclear. It might suggest that the Bragdon Court's deference to the
75. See Sutton, 119 S. CL at 2145.
76. 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999).
77. 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999).
78. See Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2137; Kirkinghurg, 119 S. Ct. at 2169.
79. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 640-41.
80. See id. at 639-40.
81. See id at 640.
82. See id at 640-41.
83. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2145.
84. Id.
85. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).
86. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2145.
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Department of Justice interpretation of the term was misplaced as a
technical matter; because the Department of Justice did not have the
authority to promulgate that regulation, it was not entitled to defer-
ence under Chevron. That does not mean, however, that the agencies'
interpretation of the disability definition as to HIV is not entitled to
deference. The agencies' interpretation has persuasive authority
based on their specialized expertise and experience.87 Accordingly,
the Court's view of the regulations in Sutton does not reverse its reli-
ance on them in Bragdon.
The Court's determination in Sutton of whether an employee or
applicant for employment is "regarded as" disabled under the third
prong of the disability definition is more troublesome. The Court
noted two scenarios that might arise under that sub-definition of disa-
bility: in the employment context, the employer must either believe
that the individual has an impairment imposing a substantial limita-
tion when in fact the individual does not have an impairment, or the
covered entity must believe that the individual has a substantially limit-
ing impairment when in fact the impairment is not substantially limit-
ing.88 The Court adopted the EEOC's "more than one job" rule,
explaining that
[w]hen the major life activity under consideration is that of
working, the statutory phrase 'substantially limits' requires,
at a minimum, that plaintiffs allege they are unable to work
in a broad class of jobs. Reflecting this requirement, the
EEOC uses a specialized definition of the term "substantially
limits" when referring to the major life activity of working:
'significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class
of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as com-
pared to the average person having comparable training,
skills and abilities. The inability to perform a single, particu-
lar job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the ma-
jor life activity of working.'89
In noting these two scenarios, the Court did not reference a third
theory set forth in the EEOC regulations. Under that theory, the indi-
vidual may have an "impairment that substantially limits major life ac-
tivities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such
impairment."9" The EEOC's Interpretative Guidance goes further in
87. See 1 KENNETH CuLp DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE
§ 6.3, at 242-44 (3d ed. 1994).
88. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2149-50.
89. Id. at 2151 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (1999)).
90. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(2) (1999).
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stating that the employer's perception of the condition need not be
shared by others in the field.91 Furthermore, according to the EEOC,
if the employer cannot articulate a non-discriminatory reason for the
employment action, an inference that the employer is acting on the
basis of "myth, fear, or stereotype" can be drawn.9 2 Concerns regard-
ing productivity, safety, insurance, liability, attendance, cost of accom-
modation and accessibility, workers' compensation costs, and
acceptance by coworkers and customers are included among those
that frequently result from attitudinal barriers.
Although the Bragdon ruling is of historic import as the Court's
first and only ruling in response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic, the
Court's opinion is noteworthy as a painstaking exercise in statutory
construction, interpreting the statutory text with reference only to
agency interpretations that "confirm" or "further reinforce" the
Court's own interpretation of the statutory language, and referring in
passing to the statute's congressional history only insofar as that his-
tory, in turn, was the basis for agency interpretation. While the coali-
tion responsible for the passage of the ADA assumed that it would be
interpreted with regard to its legislative history and the purpose un-
derlying its enactment, including the need for nondiscrimination
standards for individuals with HIV, that assumption collided with the
Supreme Court's approach to statutory construction-an approach
that concerns itself only with the statute's text, not with the context of
its enactment. Thus, many of the "good intentions" behind the ADA,
including its attention to HIV as a disability, have been lost as a result
of what William Eskridge Jr. has called the Supreme Court's "con-
servative process statism."93
D. The Future of Disability Discrimination
In Bragdon, the Court identified only "reproduction" as the major
life activity that Ms. Abbott's HIV infection limited;94 she had testified
that she had decided not to have children because of her HIV status.95
The Court noted, however, that by basing its ruling on reproduction,
it was simply ruling on the issue as raised and considered in the lower
courts and as stated in the first question on which the Court granted
certiorari.96 Furthermore, the Court indicated that the regulatory list-
91. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(/ (1999).
92. Id.
93. WiL.JLAM N. ESKR1DGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 298-300 (1994).
94. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 641 (1998).
95. See id. at 639.
96. See id. at 638.
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ing of major life activities should be treated as illustrative, not exhaus-
tive,97 thus opening consideration of major life activities to more than
the nine specific functions listed in the EEOC and Department ofJus-
tice regulations.98 Reproduction itself is not included in the listing.
The Court explained that "had different parties brought the suit they
would have maintained that an HIV infection imposes substantial limi-
tations on other major life activities"9 9 and furthermore implied that
there are "major life activities of many sorts."100
If reproduction is a major life activity, it should follow that non-
reproductive sexual relations should also be treated as major life activ-
ity. It follows from the Court's holding, which relied on the 1988 Of-
fice of Legal Counsel (OLC) Opinion interpreting the Rehabilitation
Act, to conclude that "intimate sexual activities," not just reproduc-
tion, should be viewed as a major life activity.1" 1 Both were identified
in the OLC Opinion as among the major life activities potentially lim-
ited by HIV, and it seems unlikely that any court would reach a con-
trary conclusion as to sexual relations without procreation as an
objective.10 2 As a result, there should be no dispute in the future that
individuals who experience a substantial limitation on reproduction
and/or sexual function (the vast majority of those claiming coverage
under Title I of the ADA) can invoke the ADA. Nevertheless, individ-
uals, such as children, whose HIV infection does not impose a substan-
tial limitation on their reproductive or sexual function, would not be
covered by this interpretation of the ADA and would need to prove
that other major life activities are substantially limited.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, individuals with HIV can
assert that their HIV status imposes a substantial limitation on their
social functioning or ability to participate in society, both as a result of
their infection and as a result of others' perception of HIV infection.
Although "participating in community activities" is not listed in the
regulatory definition of major life activity, this category of major life
activity was referenced in the ADA's legislative history.10 3 This view is
97. See id. at 638-39.
98. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1999) and 28 C.F.R. § 41.31(b)(2) (1999) (stating
that major life activities include "functions such as caring for one's self, performing man-
ual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working").
99. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 637.
100. Id.
101. Id, at 643.
102. See, e.g., McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding
that major life activity includes sexual relations in which disability in question is psychologi-
cal disorder); Doe v. District of Columbia, 796 F. Supp. 559, 568 (D.D.C. 1992) (including
procreation, sexual contact, and normal social relationships as major life activities).
103. See House Judiciary Report at 52 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 334.
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also expressed by Justice Ginsburg's concurring opinion in Bragdon:
"HIV infection ... has been regarded as a disease limiting life itself.
The disease inevitably pervades life's choices: education, employment,
family and financial undertakings. It affects the need for and, as this
case shows, the ability to obtain health care because of the reaction of
others to the impairment."104 The concurrence also cites family rela-
tions, employment potential, and ability to care for herself as major
life activities.'" 5 In short, there is some difference between the view of
life activities as discrete physical or mental functions, such as walking
or learning, and more abstract views of life activities as including a
broad range of activities necessary for full social or community
participation.
Having established that the impairment of HIV infection imposes
some limitation on one or more major life activities, the question re-
mains whether that limitation is substantial. The major life activities
typically thought to be limited by HIV infection (reproduction, sexual
relations) are the result of the infectious status of the individual with
HIV. The Bragdon Court had no difficulty concluding that the risk of
HIV transmission from mother to child (eight percent) or between
sexual partners (twenty percent) was sufficient to meet the substantial-
ity test. While advances in treatment in the future might result in
elimination of symptoms of disease, these treatments do not appar-
ently eliminate the infectious nature of HIV. As a result, despite ad-
vances in treatment, HIV may continue to be a disability because of
the risk of transmission. Looking to other, more general life activities,
such as social interaction, assessing the degree of limitation may be
more difficult. To a large degree, this limitation is the result of atti-
tudes of individuals towards the illness. These attitudes may vary
widely from individual to individual or in differing geographic areas.
As a result, absent access to expert witnesses who can assess the com-
munity response to HIV infection, it is difficult to determine to what
extent the substantial limitation can be posited on this basis. While
some individuals with HIV will be able to provide anecdotal evidence
of a response from others indicative of such an attitude, extending
that to others may be problematic.
Once the individual establishes that the discrimination was pre-
mised on myth or stereotype, additional proof that others share that
attitude should not be necessary. While the Court explained in Brag-
don that the ADA "addresses substantial limitations.., not utter inabil-
104. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 656 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
105. See id at 660 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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ities,"1 °6 application of the statutory definition does require that the
limitation be substantial. Perhaps because harm resulting from trans-
mission is so significant, any chance of transmission will be deemed to
be a substantial risk. Furthermore, while noting that "in the end, the
disability definition does not turn on personal choice,"' °7 Bragdon
does emphasize Ms. Abbott's decision not to have children as support-
ing the conclusion that her HIV infection was a limitation on her ma-
jor life activity of reproduction.1"8 Thus, it would follow, if Ms. Abbott
had not asserted that HIV was the reason for her declining to bear
children, she would not have been able to invoke the protection of
the ADA. If this is indeed the intention of the Court, it makes little
sense. It would mean that an individual with HIV who does not
choose to engage in the activity cannot claim it as a major life activity.
This is the problem presented by children with HIV: they cannot in-
voke protection of the law on the basis of reproduction or sexual rela-
tions, which leaves social participation as the only life activity. For very
young children, however, social participation itself may be limited.
Notably, Bradgon did not involve the "regarded as" definition. Ms. Ab-
bott certainly could have argued that Dr. Bragdon "regarded" her as
having a disability by treating her as an individual with a condition
that poses a direct threat to any dental professional, or, for that mat-
ter, any health care professional.
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, however, determining
whether an individual has a disability under the ADA is a complex
question. Whether individuals with asymptomatic HIV infection will
be ruled to be individuals with disabilities in future cases remains un-
clear, depending on the facts of the case. It is very likely that most, if
not all, such individuals would be covered. In any event, the litigation
of HIV as a disability may pose significant barriers to plaintiffs who
must plead and prove that their infection imposes a substantial limita-
tion on a major life activity. In many cases, this may involve public
disclosure of highly private facts. Putting into contention whether the
HIV status has restricted the individual's sexual activities, for example,
might open that issue for defendants to attempt to refute such a claim
with evidence that the individual has in fact engaged in unsafe sexual
relations.
106. Id, at 641.
107. Id,
108. See id,
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I1. OVERVIEW OF STATE LAW ISSUES
The ADA itself envisages that states and localities have provided,
and will provide, anti-discrimination protection to persons with disa-
bilities. Congress expressed its will not to interfere with these state
statutes and local ordinances, provided they afford as much, or
greater, protection against discrimination:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to invalidate or limit
the remedies, rights, and procedures of any Federal law or
law of any State or political subdivision of any State or juris-
diction that provides greater or equal protection for the
rights of individuals with disabilities than are afforded by this
Act.109
Despite the enactment of the ADA in 1990, and its apparent broad
protection of individuals with HIV/AIDS, development of protective
legal standards at the state level continued. For example, Florida and
New Jersey, both states with significant HIV populations, adopted
HIV-specific nondiscrimination laws after adoption of the ADA.110 Be-
cause the New Jersey Superior Court had previously held that AIDS
was a disability. 1 but did not reach the issue of whether HIV infection
was a disability, the New Jersey legislature saw fit to remove "any legal
ambiguity with respect to the protection of [persons who are HIV pos-
itive] against discrimination."112 Such enactments are consistent with
the argument of some commentators that despite the apparent pro-
tection of federal law, states have a significant role in addressing HIV-
based discrimination."' The adoption of HIV-specific statutes ap-
pears to be acceptable to some legislatures because HIV infection,
with its significant history of social discrimination, can be comfortably
distinguished from other disabilities, thus justifying specialized legisla-
tion. Furthermore, state nondiscrimination standards may provide
protection that exceeds that of the ADA. For example, the remedies
available in the private cause of action created under the ADA's Title
III public accommodation provisions are limited to injunctive relief,
109. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(b) (1994).
110. See FIA. STAT. ANN. § 760.50(2) (West 1997); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-4.1 and 10:5-
5(q), (gg) (West 1993 & Supp. 1999).
111. See Poff v. Caro, 549 A.2d 900 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987).
112. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5 (West 1993) (reprinting statement of Assembly Health &
Human Services Committee).
113. See Karen S. Lovitch, State AIDS-Related Legislation in the 1990s: Adopting a Language of
Hope Which Affirms Lfre, 20 NovA L. Rv. 1187, 1193-97 (1996) (recommending state HIV-
specific nondiscrimination laws).
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not compensatory or punitive damages. 1 4 As a result, several courts
have held that the claims of HIV-positive plaintiffs against health care
professionals who have refused to provide services on the basis of the
patients' HIV status are moot in cases in which the plaintiff has ob-
tained the needed health care service from another provider.1 15 The
ADA's Title I employment discrimination provisions are limited to
employers of fifteen or more employees. 6 Many state nondiscrimi-
nation laws cover smaller workplaces. For example, the Maine
Human Rights Act-invoked by Sidney Abbott along with the ADA-
covers all employers in the state of Maine without regard to number
of employees.1 1 7 Similarly, the federal Fair Housing Act is limited to
residential, non-commercial housing opportunities,' 1 8 while the laws
of many states are not so limited.1 19 State law protection fulfills an
important need in supplementing the ADA in these areas.
In reality, however, the majority of state enactments closely track
the ADA definition of disability. The federal definition may be attrac-
tive to state legislatures for several reasons. That definition has been
subject to federal agency and judicial interpretation, and thus state
legislatures may consider its meaning to be settled. Additionally, that
definition may be viewed as politically noncontroversial, given its pre-
vious adoption by Congress and continuous acceptance and use in
federal law. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the use of a defini-
tion consistent with federal law makes the state eligible for "deferral
agency" status, resulting in work-sharing agreements by which the
state agency receives federal funding to investigate and process cross-
filed discrimination complaints.
Two kinds of state and local statutes exist throughout the country
that afford protection for individuals with HIV infection. The first,
state and local disability laws, may include HIV infection within the
114. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a), incorporated by reference in 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1)
(1994).
115. See Atakpa v. Perimeter Ob-Gyn Assocs., 912 F. Supp. 1566 (N.D. Ga. 1994) (dismis-
sal for lack of standing to challenge clinic's mandatory HIV testing requirement); Hoepfl v.
Barlow, 906 F. Supp. 317 (E.D. Va. 1995) (dismissal for lack of standing to challenge sur-
geon's refusal to treat HIV-infected patient); see alsoJairath v. Dyer, 154 F.3d 1280 (11th
Cir. 1998) (noting lack of standing for ADA claim against surgeon for refusal to treat on
basis of HIV status; dismissal reversed, and remand to state court directed).
116. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5) (A) (1994).
117. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4553(4) (West 1989 & Supp. 1999).
118. See 42 U.S.C. § 3602(b) (1994). In some cases, however, such claims may be
brought under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)
(1994).
119. New York law, for example, covers commercial properties. See Seitzman v. Hudson
River Assoc., 542 N.Y.S.2d 104, 106 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989) (successful discrimination claim
against landlord of physicians whose practice included AIDS patients).
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definition of "disability," thus leaving no question as to the coverage
of individuals with or regarded as having HIV. The second, HIV-spe-
cific laws (relating, for example, to privacy, anti-discrimination, and
testing) may include express or implicit references to HIV infection
that also could provide effective redress.
All states have adopted statutes that prohibit discrimination on
the basis of disability. 120 Development of disability nondiscrimination
law at the state level, however, has not been uniform or consistent,
and although many state statutes share certain characteristics, in the
realm of HIV nondiscrimination standards, state-by-state statutory
analysis and classification reveals significant variations in coverage of
HIV. Historically, some states premised their definition of disability
on the notion that a significant and permanent impairment of ambu-
latory ability or other physical functioning, which could be verified by
medical examination, was required. 121 Many states, however, adopted
a definition that is consistent with, if not identical to, the federal statu-
tory definition as set forth initially in the Rehabilitation Act and re-
peated in the ADA, which provides a less restrictive definition of
impairment in terms of severity and duration, as well as extending
protection to individuals discriminated against based on a record of
disability or the perception of disability. The enactment of the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act in 1990 provided further impetus for state
adoption of the federal statutory standard. This definition is now the
most widely used, and at least thirty-nine states have at least one stat-
ute that contains this definition in some form. Interpreters of these
laws frequently reference federal regulations or case law directly inter-
preting the federal definition of disability. Several states, however,
have adopted statutory definitions that are apparently more inclusive
than the federal definition, typically by relaxing the requirement that
the impairment must substantially limit a major life activity.' 22 Some
120. See Lovitch, supra note 113, at 1196.
121. The South Carolina Bill of Rights for Handicapped Persons, for example, defines
"handicap" as "a substantial physical or mental impairment. . . acquired by... disease,
where the impairment is verified by medical findings and appears reasonably certain to
continue throughout the lifetime of the individual without substantial improvement." S.C.
CODE ANN. § 43-33-560 (Law. Co-op. 1997).
122. New York, for example, defines "disability" as
(a) a physical, mental or medical impairment resulting from anatomical, physio-
logical, genetic or neurological conditions which prevents the exercise of a nor-
mal bodily function or is demonstrable by medically accepted clinical or
laboratory diagnostic techniques, or (b) a record of such an impairment, or (c) a
condition regarded by others as such an impairment
N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 292(21) (McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1998).
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state statutes, however, refer to "handicap" or "disability" but do not
include any definition of those terms.
In response to the widespread problem of discrimination against
individuals with HIV, the lack of clarity regarding coverage under
state law, and the Justice Department's interpretation in 1986 against
Rehabilitation Act coverage of HIV infection as an infectious dis-
ease, 123 some states and many local governments adopted HIV-specific
statutes. Many states also adopted HIV testing and confidentiality stat-
utes and included restrictions on the discriminatory use of testing or
test results in some of these statutes.
Interpretation and analysis of state law to determine the scope of
HIV coverage presents several complex challenges. First, the specific
statutory language, on its face, may allow more than one reasonable
interpretation or application. Although state nondiscrimination en-
forcement agencies frequently interpret these statutory provisions, the
weight to be given such interpretations is not always clear. Such inter-
pretations may be issued informally and may not be adopted subse-
quently by a reviewing court. A definitive interpretation of state law
by the highest appellate court of the state, on the other hand, might
settle questions of interpretation, but as noted below, only one such
ruling has emerged that currently stands as a valid precedent. Of
course, a ruling by the highest court in the state is itself subject to
interpretation, clarification, or modification in subsequent cases.
Generalization regarding the status of HIV infection under state law is
further confounded by the fact that many states have more than one
disability nondiscrimination law. The definitions of disability con-
tained in these laws may not be uniform. Clearly then, for many
states, statutory interpretation and classification is more an art than a
science. Nevertheless, this survey at least offers conclusions about the
general contours of state law addressing HIV.
A. State HIV-Specific Statutes
The issue of whether HIV infection 124 is a protected category for
purposes of nondiscrimination statutes is perhaps best answered by
inclusion of that term in the statute itself. Only sixteen states (includ-
ing Puerto Rico), however, have enacted statutes that include the
term "HIV infection," or equivalent terminology, that clearly does not
123. Reprinted in AIDS AND THE LAw 286 (William H.L. Dornette ed., 1st ed. 1987).
124. Throughout the discussion which follows, all references to "HIV" or "HIV infec-
tion" are to asymptomatic infection, unless noted otherwise.
20001
JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY
require any disease symptoms.12 5 Of these, only seven include HIV as
a disability with protection equivalent to that of other disabilities as
defined by state law. 11 6 The other nine states offer protection more
limited in scope than that afforded other disabilities.1 27 In that re-
gard, HIV is rare among medical conditions to be explicitly named by
statute. The general trend in state law, as discussed below, has been
not to include reference to specific conditions as disabilities. Assum-
ing that a legislature wishes to extend coverage in this area, there is no
logical basis for covering individuals with AIDS but not those with
HIV. Narrow legislation, such as that of New Hampshire which pro-
hibits landlords from evicting tenants "solely on the grounds that the
[tenant] has [AIDS] or is regarded to have [AIDS], 1 28 is unique on
the state level.
In five states HIV is defined as equivalent to other disabilities as
defined by state law by simply incorporating HIV in the definition of
"disability" contained in state nondiscrimination laws.'1 9 Iowa, for ex-
ample, provides that the definition of disability in its Civil Rights Act,
which protects against discrimination in public and private employ-
ment, housing, and public accommodations, includes "the condition
of a person with a positive human immunodeficiency virus test result,
a diagnosis of [AIDS], a diagnosis of [ARC], or any other condition
related to [AIDS]."1' ° New Jersey and Nebraska take the same ap-
proach. NewJersey's definition of "handicap" includes "AIDS or HIV
infection."' 31 "HIV infection," in turn, is defined as "infection with
the human immunodeficiency virus or any other related virus identi-
fied as a probable causative agent of AIDS."1 2 The Nebraska Individ-
ual Rights Act prohibits discrimination in public and private
employment, housing, education, and public accommodations on the
basis that the individual discriminated against "is suffering or is sus-
125. Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, Ne-
braska, NewJersey, North Carolina, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. These
states are identified in the accompanying Appendix A, column A.
126. Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, Nebraska, New Jersey, and Puerto Rico. Con-
sult the accompanying compilation of state statutes in Appendix B for specific citation to
statutory provisions.
127. Hawaii, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, Vermont, Virginia, Wash-
ington, and Wisconsin.
128. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:10.VI (1999).
129. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.50(2) (West 1997); IOWA CODE ANN. § 216.2(5) (West
Supp. 1999); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 207.135 (Banks-Baldwin 1997); NEB. REv. STAT. § 20-167
(1997); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(q) (West Supp. 1999).
130. IOWA CODE ANN. § 216.2(5) (West Supp. 1999).
131. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(q) (West Supp. 1999).
132. Id § 10:5-5(gg).
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pected of suffering from human immunodeficiency virus infection or
acquired immunodeficiency syndrome." '33 Similarly, Florida provides
that "[a]ny person with or perceived as having . . .human immu-
nodeficiency virus shall have every protection made available to handi-
capped persons."134 This definition is applicable then to several
Florida statutes that provide nondiscrimination standards in public
and private employment, housing, and education (including employ-
ment by educational facilities). Florida law also specifies two addi-
tional contexts in which HIV-based discrimination is unlawful. First,
entities receiving state financial assistance may not discriminate
against an otherwise qualified individual in housing, public accommo-
dations, or government services on the basis that the individual is "in-
fected with [HV]."135 Next, Florida courts are prohibited from
denying "shared parental responsibility, custody, or visitation rights to
a parent or grandparent solely because that parent or grandparent is
or is believed to be infected with [HIV]."136 Finally, Colorado 37 and
Puerto Rico138 have broad, legislatively declared policies against HIV
discrimination. Although these policy declarations do not include a
reference to a specific enforcement mechanism, they compel the con-
clusion that HIV is a disability under general disability non-discrimina-
tion laws of those jurisdictions.
Other states that have adopted HIV-specific standards have not
done so as broadly. Hawaii, for example, prohibits discrimination in
housing on the basis of HIV,1 39 but does not extend such explicit pro-
tection in other categories, such as employment and public accommo-
dations. Kentucky's HIV-specific statute provides that "[a]ny person
with [AIDS], [ARC], or human immunodeficiency virus shall have
every protection made available to individuals with disabilities under
the employment nondiscrimination provisions of Kentucky Revised
Statutes and Section 504 [of] the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. '1140 Simi-
larly, both Vermont141 and Washington142 limit their HIV protection
133. NEB. REv. STAT. § 20-168 (1997).
134. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.50(2) (West 1997).
135. Id § 760.50(4)(a)-(b).
136. Id § 61.13(6).
137. See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 254-1401 (West Supp. 1999).
138. See P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 1, § 521 (1999).
139. See HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. § 515-3 (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1999).
140. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 207.135(1) (Banks-Baldwin 1997). Presumably, even if the
Rehabilitation Act were interpreted not to cover HIV, individuals with HIV would never-
theless have the same rights as individuals with disabilities under the cross-referenced Ken-
tucky law. Apparently the Kentucky legislature did not anticipate that the Rehabilitation
Act could be read not to cover HIV.
141. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495(a)(6)-(7) (Lexis Supp. 1999).
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to public and private employment and do not include other settings,
such as housing or public accommodations. Discrimination in those
settings is covered under another statute that does not specify HIV. 4 '
Maryland,"' Virginia,14 and Wisconsin 146 require public safety per-
sonnel not to discriminate on the basis of HIV status. Montana law
provides that a "health care facility may not refuse to admit a person
to the facility solely because the person has an HIV-related condi-
tion." '47 That law provides that "HIV-related condition means any
medical condition resulting from an HIV infection, including but not
limited to seropositivity for HIV." 4'
North Carolina's HIV-specific statute is unique in that although it
specifically references HIV and purports to grant protection from dis-
crimination on that basis, it actually authorizes as lawful as many
forms of discrimination as it declares unlawful. The North Carolina
Communicable Disease Act (NCCDA) prohibits discrimination in con-
tinued employment, housing, public services, public accommodations,
and public transportation against "any person having AIDS virus or
HIV infection on account of that infection."' 49 The NCCDA also pro-
hibits the use or requirement of HIV testing to determine suitability
for continued employment, housing, public services, public accommo-
dations, and public transportation. 15 ' However, the NCCDA allows
HIV testing of job applicants, denial of employment to job applicants
based on HIV status, and HIV testing as an annual medical examina-
tion routinely required of all employees by an employer. Reassign-
ment or termination of employment is allowed if the employee poses
142. See WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 49.60.172 (West 1990 & Supp. 2000).
143. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4501 (1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.010 (West
Supp. 2000).
144. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 18-213(m) (Supp. 1999) (mandating that fire
fighters, emergency medical technicians, rescue squads, law enforcement officers, and cor-
rectional officers "may not refuse to treat or transport an individual because the individual
is HIV positive"); Id. § 18-213.2(h) (mandating that correctional officers, first responders,
law enforcement officers, medical care facilities, and physicians performing postmortem
exams are prohibited from discrimination in regard to the transportation of HIV positive
decedents).
145. See VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-45.2 (Michie 1997) (stating that public safety agencies
include the sheriff's office, adult or youth correctional, law enforcement, and fire safety
organizations, or any governmental agency or department that employs persons who have
law enforcement authority).
146. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 252.14 (West 1999) (prohibiting discrimination by health
care providers, peace officers, fire fighters, correctional officers, state patrol officers, jail-
ers, home health agencies, and inpatient health care facilities).
147. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-5-105(2)(a) (1999).
148. Id § 50-5-105(2) (b) (ii).
149. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-148(i) (1999).
150. See id. § 130A-148(i).
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a significant risk to himself or others, or if the employee is unable to
perform the normally assigned duties of the job. The NCCDA also
allows licensed health care providers and facilities to discriminate
against patients with HIV infection "to protect the health care pro-
vider or employees of the provider or employees of the facility while
providing appropriate care" and to refer the patient with HIV to an-
other provider or facility "when such referral is for the purpose of
providing more appropriate treatment." '5 ' The disingenuous nature
of this "protective" enactment is obvious.15 2 In sum, of the sixteen
states with HIV-specific statutes, only seven provide "across the board"
protection (although one of these, Florida, does not include public
accommodations); eight provide coverage equivalent to other disabili-
ties, but limit that coverage to certain contexts or settings of varying
scope; and one state, North Carolina, allows significantly greater dis-
crimination against individuals with HIV than it or federal law allows
against individuals with other disabilities.
In light of questions now raised as to whether HIV infection is or
is not a disability under the general definition used in federal law, as
well as in the laws of many states, HIV-specific legislation takes on a
new significance. Depending on how such provisions are drafted,
however, HIV-specific statutes may be interpreted to mean that HIV is
not included in more general definitions of disability. The explicit
inclusion of HIV in one provision indicates, arguably, that HIV is not
covered by a general definition included in some other statute or pro-
vision. If it were, there would be no need for the HIV-specific enact-
ment. For example, Hawaii's HIV-specific housing provision' may
be interpreted to mean that HIV is not covered under the general
disability definition applicable to employment discrimination. Addi-
tionally, inclusion of HIV infection might be construed as an indica-
tion that other infectious diseases were intended to be omitted from
coverage. To avoid this statutory construction, the Iowa Civil Rights
Act provides that the inclusion of positive HIV test results within the
definition of disability "does not preclude" the inclusion of other
"conditions resulting from other contagious or infectious diseases"
within that definition.
154
151. Id § 130A-148(j).
152. See Jeremy McKinney, Comment, HIV, AIDS &Job Discrimination: North Carolina's
Failure and Federal Redemption, 17 CAMPBELL L. REv. 115 (1995); Angela Sue Bullard, North
Carolina's New AIDS Discrimination Protection: Who Do They Think They're Fooling, 12 CAMPBELL
L. REv. 475 (1990).
153. See HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 515-3 (Michie 1993).
154. IOWA CODE ANN. § 216.2 (West Supp. 1999).
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Finally, as described above, some HIV-specific statutes cover HIV-
infected individuals, but not those perceived to be infected or those
with a positive HIV test result. If read literally, this version of the HIV-
specific definition would exclude from coverage individuals who have
tested or appear to have tested positive but who are not in fact in-
fected with HIV. Such individuals would include infants who have
their mother's antibodies to HIV, vaccine trial participants, and indi-
viduals with false positive test results or medical records erroneously
indicating a positive test result.
B. State Law Limitations on Use of HIV Testing or Test Results1 55
After a reliable test for HIV antibodies became widely available in
1985 and the evils resulting from the misuse of such testing became
known, many states adopted informed consent for testing and HIV-
related information confidentiality statutes. Because breaches of con-
fidentiality frequently result in discrimination (and in many cases are
motivated by an interest in discriminating against an individual with
HIV), some states also adopted statutes that prohibit the use of HIV
test results to discriminate against any individual who has been tested
or has tested positive or that prohibit HIV testing for purposes, such
as employment screening where testing is not fully voluntary and the
results will be used to discriminate. As a result, these "information
restrictive" statutes appear to protect from discrimination based on
knowledge of test results, not actual or perceived HIV status.
Twelve states have adopted statutes that impose limitations on the
use of HIV testing or HIV test results for discriminatory purposes.' 56
Of the twelve states in this category, only three impose broad restric-
tions on the use of such information in employment, public accom-
modations, housing, and other areas. 157 Six states impose restrictions
155. This survey does not include the many state statutes that address the problem of
transactions involving "stigmatized" real estate owned or occupied by someone with HIV/
AIDS. These statutes frequently abrogate any duty on the part of the seller or realtor to
disclose any HIV-related stigmatizing information to potential buyers and thus may limit
buyers' ability to discriminate against a seller with AIDS, but they do not address the issue
of discrimination directly. Thus, for example, if a potential buyer of such a property
chooses not to bid on a property because of stigma, or offers a low bid because of
knowledge of the stigma, there is typically no remedy under such statutes. For a general
discussion of this issue, see AIDS AND THE LAw, supra note 4, § 6.12 (David W. Webber ed.,
3d ed. 1997).
156. Arkansas, California, Florida, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, New
Mexico, Ohio, Rhode Island and Texas. These states are identified in the accompanying
Appendix A, column B.
157. Hawaii, Kansas and Rhode Island.
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only in the employment context.158 Two states impose limits on HIV
testing and the use of results do so in the health care context.159 One
state, Ohio, prohibits discrimination by health care providers, public
services and publicly-funded services." 6 In the case of some states,
such as Florida, it is not clear that the adoption of nondiscrimination
standards applicable to HIV information adds or necessarily clarifies
nondiscrimination standards, given that the state also has broad non-
discrimination provisions separate from the information restrictive
statute. 16 1 Nevertheless, such enactments may be valuable in enhanc-
ing public awareness of the confidentiality provisions applicable to
HIV information.
Although these testing and confidentiality statutes may offer pro-
tection in many instances, if read literally they provide significantly
weaker protection than nondiscrimination enactments that define dis-
criminatory conduct and the protected category more broadly. For
example, statutes that restrict use of HIV test results in the employ-
ment context may be interpreted by the courts not to protect the job
applicant who is discriminated against because the potential em-
ployer, who is not aware of a specific test result, is aware only of ru-
mors that the applicant is HIV infected. In that case, the information
relied on is not derived (at least directly) from any HIV test result, and
to protect that applicant, it could be argued, would not serve the pur-
pose of enhancing confidentiality for HIV test results and prohibiting
their misuse. But under a statute that provides protection based on
HIV status, either actual or perceived, protection from discrimination
is significantly strengthened. As another example of the limited scope
of these laws, Maryland's HIV informed consent testing statute pro-
vides that refusal to undergo HIV testing may not be used "as the sole
basis by an institution or laboratory to deny services or treatment."162
Such enactments may protect the limited group of individuals who
might refuse testing and would not be protected under other nondis-
crimination laws, either because they could not successfully claim to
have been perceived to be HIV infected or because state law does not
protect from discrimination on that basis. On its face, however, the
Maryland statute would not reach refusal to treat based on HIV status
itself. Some of these information restrictive statutes provide protec-
158. California, Florida, Kentucky, Maine, New Mexico and Texas.
159. Arkansas and Maryland.
160. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3701.245(A) (Anderson 1999).
161. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.50 (West 1997).
162. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 18-336(c) (Supp. 1999).
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tion from inquiries regarding HIV testing or the results of such
testing.
There are no reported decisions that interpret these statutes, but
in one case in an analogous setting, Urbaniak v. Newton, 6 ' the Califor-
nia Court of Appeals narrowly interpreted the California confidential-
ity statute, limiting its application to disclosure of HIV test results by
individuals having access to the record of such results."6 In that case,
at the conclusion of an examination by a physician retained by the
plaintiff's worker compensation insurer, the plaintiff disclosed his
HIV status to a nurse so that she would comply with infection control
precautions and avoid transmission of HIV to herself or others. 6 '
The physician, however, disclosed the HIV information to several
third parties without the plaintiff's knowledge or consent.166 The
Court of Appeals concluded that because the legislature's intent in
enacting the statute was to encourage individuals with HIV to seek
testing and treatment, the confidentiality statute's application was lim-
ited to "persons and institutions that conduct tests for AIDS, assume
responsibility for custody or distribution of test results, or use test re-
sults in connection with treatment of [sic] affected person."' 67 The
physician's disclosure of the plaintiffs HIV status thus did not violate
the statute.' 68
C. State Law Incorporation of Federal Disability Standards
By far, the largest category of states incorporates the federal disa-
bility standard as generally set forth in the Americans with Disabilities
Act and other federal statutes.'6 ' Thirty-nine states use this definition
163. 277 Cal. Rptr. 354 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). For a criticism of this ruling as a "cramped
reading" of the California statute, see Roger Doughty, Comment, The Confidentiality of HIV-
Related Information: Responding to the Resurgence of Aggressive Public Health Interventions in the
AIDS Epidemic, 82 CAL. L. REv. 111, 143-45 (1994).
164. See Urbaniak, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
165. See id. at 356.
166. See id.
167. Id at 362.
168. See id
169. For purposes of this discussion and the accompanying Compilation of State Stat-
utes, the "federal disability standard" defines "disability" as an impairment that imposes a
substantial limitation on a major life activity, a record of such an impairment, or the per-
ception of such an impairment, as discussed more fully supra at text accompanying notes
22-30. While there is no federal statutory definition of "impairment" or "major life activ-
ity," some state statutes in this category incorporate the federal regulatory definitions for
these terms, although they stop short of incorporating any of the regulations' specific ref-
erences to HIV as an impairment or a disability. States using these definitions are identi-
fied in the accompanying Appendix A, column C. Delaware's employment discrimination
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in one or more statute, 1 7 0 and of these states, eighteen states, the Dis-
trict of Columbia, and Guam do not have any specific HIV statutory
protection. 171 In these states, protection for HIV infection, if it exists,
is based on these statutes. Additionally, among the eighteen states
with HIV-specific statutes of limited application or statutes that pro-
hibit discriminatory use of HIV testing or test results in only limited
settings,172 fourteen also use the federal standard to define "disability"
for at least some purpose under state law. 173 As a result, the federal
disability standard significantly effects the rights of individuals with
HIV in at least thirty-two states.
In some states, the state administrative agencies responsible for
enforcement at the administrative level have interpreted the statute as
including HIV infection. Whether these interpretations would be ac-
cepted by a state court interpreting the statute is open to question.
Nevertheless, such agency interpretations at least assure potential
complainants that a claim of discrimination based on HIV status will
be accepted by the enforcement agency.
These state statutory definitions pose difficulties in interpretation
in regard to the impact of federal court decisions interpreting analo-
gous provisions under federal law. The California Fair Employment
and Housing Act (FEHA), for example, prohibits discrimination
based on physical or mental "disability" and "medical condition" in
public and private employment, housing, and professional licensure,
and incorporates the federal definition of disability.' 7 4 However, no
reported California court decision has directly addressed the question
of whether asymptomatic HIV infection is a disability under California
law, although one trial court has so ruled in an unreported deci-
sion.1 75 Decisions involving symptomatic HIV illness or other condi-
law is arguably broader than federal law in its definition of disability, and Indiana's hous-
ing discrimination law provides a definition broader than that of federal law.
170. See Appendix A, column C.
171. Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Da-
kota, Tennessee, Utah, and West Virginia. Courts in Minnesota and West Virginia have
also held that HIV infection is a disability. See infra text and accompanying notes 195 and
199.
172. Arkansas, California, Hawaii, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, Wisconsin.
173. Arkansas, California, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Montana, New Mexico,
Ohio, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin. See Appendix A, column C.
174. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12955.3, 12926(k) (West 1992 & Supp. 1998).
175. See California Judge Awards $729,000 to HIV-Positive Discharged Employee, 88 DAILY LAB.
REP., May 10, 1994, at A5 (summarizing Perrault v. Educ. Testing Serv., Inc., No. 707306-7
(Cal. Super. Ct., Alameda County May 6, 1994)).
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tions shed some light on the interpretation of this concept under
California law. Thus, the California Supreme Court has ruled that the
potential for a medical condition to become disabling in the future is
enough to establish it as a current disability. 176 AIDS itself has been
recognized as a disability in part because of the potentially debilitating
future effects of the illness,17 7 but other rulings suggest that such a
reading of the FEHA may be unjustifiably broad.'l7  Accordingly, the
precise meaning of the FEHA may be open to some question until a
definitive ruling is issued by the California Supreme Court. Similarly,
California's Unruh Civil Rights Act 1 79 prohibits discrimination based
on "disability" in public accommodations or business establishments,
as does the Disabled Persons Act,180 which incorporates the federal
definition of disability. One federal district court has concluded, al-
beit with little discussion of the issue, that HIV infection is a disability
for purposes of the Unruh Act.'81 The FEHA and Unruh Act take the
ADA as establishing at least a minimum non-discrimination standard,
and thus a violation of the ADA is deemed a violation of these state
laws.' 82 Yet, as discussed above, given the current state of federal
court interpretation of the ADA, the precise contours of its protection
of individuals with HIV have not been defined. Furthermore, Brag-
don-like defenses, challenging HIV as a disability under state disability
definitions, could be litigated under state law in any case in which HIV
is the claimed disability. Bragdon, based as it is exclusively on an inter-
pretation of federal law, might be persuasive but not controlling au-
thority in such cases. Such defenses would be foreclosed only in states
such as California and Kentucky, which provide that their statutes are
to be interpreted consistently with federal law or in California's case
that federal law establishes a minimum standard for nondis-
crimination.
176. See American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 651 P.2d 1151,
1155-56 (Cal. 1982) (classifying hypertension as a disability).
177. See Raytheon Co. v. California Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 261 Cal. Rptr.
197, 201 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (AIDS diagnosis, but noting that condition need not be
presently disabling to qualify as a physical handicap).
178. See Cassista v. Community Foods, Inc., 856 P.2d 1143 (Cal. 1993) (summarizing
legislative history of FEHA disability provisions in regard to federal law and rejecting a
claim that obesity is a disability).
179. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 1982).
180. CAL. Crv. CODE § 54 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
181. See Kotev v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 927 F. Supp. 1316 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (finding
that HIV infection is a disability under the Unruh Act for purposes of establishing a claim
of "associational" discrimination).
182. See CAL. CIrV. CODE §§ 51, 54 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
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D. State Statutory Definitions of Disability Not Adopting the
Federal Standard
Fourteen states employ a definition of disability in at least one
nondiscrimination statute that either departs significantly from the
federal standard or does not set forth any definition. While these stat-
utes are open to varying interpretation, eight of these states appear to
define "disability" more broadly than does federal law,18 while one
state, Texas, appears to define it more narrowly. The remaining five
states do not include any comprehensive statutory definition."l 4
Unlike the federal definition, which includes the requirement
that the impairment result in a substantial limitation on major life
activity, the states that define "disability" more broadly than the fed-
eral standard typically do not impose any requirement regarding se-
verity. Instead, these states require that there be a documented
impairment. In these states, courts and enforcement agencies may be
more likely to regard HIV infection as a disability and less likely to
find rulings by federal courts persuasive in interpreting state law.
Most notably in this category, the New York Human Rights Law
(NYHRL) defines "disability" as
(a) a physical, mental or medical impairment resulting from
anatomical, physiological, genetic or neurological conditions
which prevents the exercise of a normal bodily function or is
demonstrable by medically accepted clinical or laboratory di-
agnostic techniques or (b) a record of such an impairment
or (c) a condition regarded by others as such an impairment
185
Several New York state court decisions indicate that there is no ques-
tion that HIV is covered under this definition."8 6 Nevertheless, other
courts have noted that the NYHRL's definition of disability is stricter,
not broader, than that of federal law."8 ' These decisions appear to
183. Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, New York, and
Oregon.
184. Alabama (as to public employment, housing, and public accommodations), Arkan-
sas (as to public accommodations and housing), Mississippi (as to public employment,
employment by state-funded employers), Washington (as to public accommodations, hous-
ing, and real estate transactions, financing, and credit), and Wyoming (as to public and
private employment). Note, however, that the Wyoming Fair Employment Commission
Rules of Practice incorporate the federal definition of disability.
185. N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 292(21) (McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1998).
186. See, e.g., Petri v. Bank of NewYork Co., 582 N.Y.S.2d 608, 611 (1992) (holding that
asymptomatic HIV infection, whether actual or perceived, is disability under New York
law).
187. See Scott v. Flaghouse, Inc., 980 F. Supp. 731 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Aquinas v. Federal
Express Corp., 940 F. Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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ignore the second element of the definition, which includes impair-
ments that are demonstrable by medically accepted clinical or labora-
tory diagnostic techniques. Similarly, in terms of broader-than-federal
protection, the Connecticut Human Rights and Opportunities Act de-
fines "physical disability" as a "chronic physical handicap, infirmity or
impairment, whether congenital or... from illness .... ,,188 Because
HIV infection is likely to be deemed a chronic physical impairment
resulting from illness,1 8 9 such a statute provides a strong case for cov-
erage of HIV infection. Again, the Illinois Human Rights Act prohib-
its discrimination on the basis of "handicap," which is defined as a
"determinable physical or mental characteristic of a person .... the
history of such characteristic, or the perception of such characteristic
by the person complained against, which may result from disease
.... 190 The Illinois Supreme Court has interpreted the Illinois stat-
ute to cover HIV infection. 9 The Indiana Equal Access to Housing
for Persons with Disabilities Law defines an individual with a disability
as "an individual who, by reason of physical or mental defect or infir-
mity, whether congenital or acquired by accident, injury, or disease, is
or may subsequently be totally or partially prevented from achieving
the fullest attainable, physical, social, economic, mental and voca-
tional participation in the normal process of living." '9 2 The Maryland
Human Rights Act prohibits discrimination in public and private em-
ployment, housing, public accommodations, retail services and by per-
sons licensed or regulated by the State Department of Licensing and
Regulations on the basis of physical or mental handicap, or perceived
handicap, which is defined as "any physical disability . . . which is
"1193caused by . . . illness ....
Texas, however, maintains standards that appear to be narrower
than federal law. The Texas Rights and Responsibilities of Persons
with Disabilities Act defines "disability" as a "mental or physical disabil-
ity, including mental retardation, hearing impairment, deafness,
speech impairment, visual impairment, or any health impairment that
requires special ambulatory devices or services."' 9 4 Thus, asymptom-
atic conditions would not likely be covered by this definition.
188. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-51(15) (West 1995 & Supp. 1999).
189. See, e.g., Raintree Health Care Ctr. v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n, 672 N.E.2d
1136, 1141 (11. 1996), affg 655 N.E.2d 944 (11. Ct. App. 1995).
190. 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-103(I) (West 1993 & Supp. 1999).
191. See Raintree Health Care Ctr., 672 N.E.2d at 1141.
192. IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9-6 (West 1997).
193. MD. CODE ANN. art. 49B, § 15(g) (Michie 1957 & Supp. 1991).
194. TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 121.002(4) (West Supp. 1998).
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E. Judicial Interpretations of State Nondiscrimination Law
Given the considerable ambiguity in state law on the question of
coverage of HIV infection, some clarification of standards might be
expected from the state courts themselves or from federal courts ap-
plying state law. To date, however, the highest courts of appeal in
only three states have addressed this issue. Two of those rulings, Ben-
jamin R. v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 95 and Burgess v. Your House of Ra-
leigh, Inc., 96 involved state law issues that were affected by subsequent
legislation,197 and thus those rulings are of limited precedential value.
But in a third ruling, Raintree Health Care Center v. Illinois Human Rights
Commission, the Illinois Supreme Court held that HIV infection is a
disability under the Illinois Human Rights Act, given that statute's def-
inition of disability as "a determinable physical characteristic resulting
from a disease."198 Because of the specific state statutory language on
which that ruling is based, however, it may be of limited precedential
value in most states, especially those that have adopted the federal
definition.
Several state intermediate appellate and federal courts, applying
state law, have addressed the issue of HIV infection as a disability. In
Beaulieu v. Clausen,'99 the Minnesota Court of Appeals has interpreted
the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) to cover asymptomatic
HIV infection.2" The MHRA's definition of "disability" follows that of
federal law, and the court concluded that individuals with HIV are
materially limited in several major life activities, including social par-
ticipation (because of emotional or psychological problems such as
depression as well as ostracism by others), sexual and reproductive
activities, and employment.20' In Robinson v. Henry Ford Health Sys-
tems202 a federal district court noted, albeit with little discussion, that
HIV is a disability under Michigan law, which incorporates the federal
195. 390 S.E.2d 814 (W. Va. 1990) (recognizing that subsequent legislation conformed
statute in question more closely to federal law, although court's reasoning in concluding
that HIV imposes a substantial limitation on major life activities may be persuasive under
the subsequent legislation and that of other states).
196. 388 S.E.2d 134 (N.C. 1990). This case was decided before the adoption of North
Carolina's Communicable Disease Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-148(i), prohibiting discrim-
ination in continuing employment.
197. See Burgess, 388 S.E.2d at 141-42; Benjamin 1R 390 S.E.2d at 816 n.5.
198. Raintree Health Care Ctr. v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n, 672 N.E.2d 1136,
1141 (Ill. 1996), afg 655 N.E.2d 944 (Ill. Ct. App. 1995) (quoting 775 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/1-103(I) (West 1993 & Supp. 1997)).
199. 491 N.W.2d 662 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
200. See id. at 666.
201. See id
202. 892 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
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definition of disability.2 3 Similarly, in Kotev v. First Colony Life Insur-
ance Co.,2°4 a federal district court concluded, without discussion, that
HIV infection is a disability under the California's Unruh Act for pur-
poses of establishing a claim of "associational" discrimination.20 5 In
Rose City Oil Co. v. Missouri Commission on Human Rights, 20 6 the Mis-
souri Court of Appeals ruled that an individual discriminated against
on the basis of perception of HIV infection was not protected under
Missouri law.207 That decision was reversed by legislation.20 8
Several rulings by New York courts have accepted HIV infection
as a disability, given New York's broad definition of that term. In one
case, Petri v. Bank of New York Co.,2 09 the Supreme Court for the
County of New York ruled that asymptomatic HIV infection, whether
perceived or actual, is a disability under New York state law.2 ° More
recently, in Cahill v. Rosa, 11 the New York Court of Appeals ruled in
favor of a patient with HIV infection on the question of whether a
dentist's office is a public accommodation. 212 HIV infection has been
assumed to be a disability in several other cases reported in the New
York Supreme Court, Appellate Division.2 1 1
Although there is no question that HIV infection is covered by
New Jersey's statutory definition of "handicap, '2 14 in Poff v. Caro,2 1 5
the court held that New Jersey law prohibits housing discrimination
based on perception that an individual has AIDS or might be at risk
for AIDS, reasoning that there is no logical basis for distinguishing
between those with a disability and those so perceived.2 1 ' This reason-
ing would apply as well in cases of HIV infection.
203. See id& at 180.
204. 927 F. Supp. 1316 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
205. See id at 1320.
206. 832 S.W.2d 314 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
207. See id at 317.
208. The Missouri HIV and Public Health Act provides that the Missouri Human Rights
Act, Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 213.010-213.137 (West 1996 & Supp. 1998), "shall apply to individ-
uals with HIV infection ... ." Mo. ANN. STAT. § 191.665 (West 1996).
209. 582 N.Y.S.2d 608 (1992).
210. See id. at 611.
211. 674 N.E.2d 274 (N.Y. 1996).
212. See id at 277.
213. See e.g., Doe v. Jamaica Hosp., 608 N.Y.S.2d 518 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (mem.);
Syracuse Community Health Ctr. v. Wendi A.M., 604 N.Y.S.2d 406 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993),
affd, 659 N.E.2d 760 (N.Y. 1995).
214. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(q) (West 1999).
215. 549 A.2d 900 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987).
216. See id. at 903.
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Finally, in Abbott v. Bragdon, the First Circuit noted that its disposi-
tion of issues under the ADA was dispositive of those under Maine law
as well, given the co-extensive coverage of the two statutes.217
F. State Law Exclusion of Coverage for Communicable Diseases
Only Georgia and Idaho include explicit exclusions of communi-
cable or infectious disease from their nondiscrimination standards.21 8
Most states have abandoned these provisions in favor of "direct threat"
provisions that parallel the "direct threat" provision in the ADA. 19
Other states have retained such exclusions in statutes governing spe-
cific occupations, such as food service workers. 22' Generally, these
statutes are interpreted as inapplicable in the context of HIV, given
the well-established view that there is no risk of HIV transmission in
the applicable workplaces. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina interpreted the former North Carolina Handicapped Per-
sons Protection Act2 21 as not applying to HIV infection because of the
statutory exemption of "communicable diseases" from the definition
of handicap.222 In a more recent case, however, the Supreme Court
of Illinois rejected an employer's defense that public health regula-
tions required the dismissal of a food service employee with a "conta-
gious or infectious disease." 22' But in Sanchez v. Lagoudakis,2 24 the
Michigan Supreme Court ruled that an employer can require an em-
ployee, who is rumored to have AIDS, to undergo a medical examina-
tion to determine whether she can be safely employed as a waitress. 22
217. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 937 n.1 (1st Cir. 1997).
218. See GA. CODE ANN. § 34-GA-3 (1999); IDAHO CODE § 67-5910 (1999). Kentucky also
has a communicable disease exception, but that exception is limited by HIV-specific provi-
sions included in other Kentucky non-discrimination laws. See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 207.140 (Banks-Baldwin 1997).
219. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994).
220. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.01, Subd. 35(2) (West 1999).
221. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168A-1-12 (1987).
222. See Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, Inc., 388 S.E.2d 134, 138, 140 (N.C. 1990).
North Carolina law has since been amended, and although its protection is limited, that
specific exemption has been deleted.
223. Raintree Health Care Ctr. v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n, 672 N.E.2d 1136,
1143-45 (Ill. 1996).
224. 581 N.W.2d 257 (Mich. 1998).
225. See id. at 265.
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G. The Demographics of State HIV Non-Discrimination Standards
Given the foregoing description of HIV protective legal stan-
dards, the jurisdictions included in this survey226 can be placed into
three categories. First, eleven states227 and Puerto Rico have clearly
established protection for HIV infection, either from explicit statutory
language, judicial precedent, or a combination of both. Second, only
four states228 and the U.S. Virgin Islands provide little or no protec-
tion for HIV infection, primarily because of the lack of a disability
nondiscrimination law of broad application. Finally, in the third and
largest category are the remaining states, in which coverage of HIV
cannot be determined with certainty, given the lack of specific statu-
tory language pertaining to HIV and the lack of judicial precedent on
the question. In this third category, some states may in practice cover
HIV as a disability, and cases involving claims of HIV discrimination
may have resulted in successful settlements for plaintiffs with HIV but
without reported judicial opinions addressing the question of HIV as a
disability. The important point here, however, is the absence of clear,
identifiable legal standards. Without such legal standards, persons or
entities that might engage in discrimination on the basis of HIV do
not have a clear compliance standard, and, perhaps more impor-
tantly, individuals with HIV have no assurance that they have legal
protection. Public health strategies, such as HIV case reporting, are
frequently premised on the assurance of at least adequate nondiscrim-
ination standards. The absence of that assurance for a significant
number of individuals with HIV thus can have profound implications
for public health policy.
In order to determine roughly the proportionate extent that the
population of individuals with HIV is represented within the jurisdic-
tions as grouped in these three categories, comparisons of the propor-
tionate distribution of individuals with AIDS within these categories
were calculated. 229 The states in which protection for individuals can
be said to be clearly established as a result of explicit statutory lan-
guage or court precedent include less than one-half (forty-six per-
cent) of the reported cases of AIDS. On the other hand, those
226. We do not, however, take into account the impact that local legislation may have in
protecting against HIV infection discrimination.
227. Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Iowa, Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Ne-
braska, New Jersey, and New York.
228. Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, and North Carolina.
229. Because comparative state-by-state HIV infection data are not available, we use the
most recent rates of AIDS cases as published in CDC, HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REPORT
(mid-year ed., June 1999) (table 1) as a rough estimate of the comparative extent of HIV
infection in specific jurisdictions.
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jurisdictions that significantly limit or have no protection for HIV in-
fection in major areas include approximately six percent of the re-
ported cases.230  Most significantly, however, because of the
widespread reliance on the federal definition of disability, roughly
half (forty-eight percent) of that population is reported in jurisdic-
tions in which the legal standards have a degree of uncertainty regard-
ing protection for individuals with HIV.
Perhaps not surprisingly, the states that do not have clear, identi-
fiable legal standards are almost exclusively those relying on the fed-
eral definition of disability. Thus, to the extent that Bragdon v. Abbott
and the more recent Supreme Court ADA cases can be read as sup-
porting the conclusion that HIV infection is a disability, such cases
should influence the interpretation of the disability definition in
those states in the direction of inclusion of individuals with HIV. Ad-
ditionally, there appears to be no trend in the state courts, as there
was at one point in the lower federal courts, to question whether HIV
infection is a disability. On the contrary, the few precedents in this
area indicate a trend towards including HIV as a disability. At this
point, however, the question of whether and to what extent individu-
als with HIV infection are protected from discrimination under these
state laws remains a question that is open to dispute. In that sense,
now, a dozen years after the Presidential Commission on the Human
Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic called for a "strong national pol-
icy " " against HIV discrimination, the law has not yet fully embodied
that policy.
230. Although this is a relatively small percentage, the actual number of individuals
within this category is significant. The states in this category and the U.S. Virgin Islands all
provide reports of confidential HIV test results. Based on these reports, the CDC, in its
most recent report, reported that a total of 34,740 individuals were living with HIV or AIDS
in those jurisdictions. The inadequacy of legal protections in these jurisdictions, it should
be noted, is not the result of a failure to include asymptomatic HIV infection; these juris-
dictions also fail to provide any protection for AIDS or symptomatic HIV infection.
231. See supra note 12.
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APPENDIX A:
HIV. INFECTION AS PROTECTED BY STATE STATUTE IN THE
U.S. (INCLUDING GUAM, PUERTO RICO, AND
THE U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS)
Key to Table:
A = Statute explicitly includes protection for HIV
B = Statute bars discriminatory use of HIV testing or test information
C = Statute uses "federal disability" standard
D = Statute uses disability definition other than federal standard (or does not define term)
E = Judicial precedent interprets statute as covering HIV infection
F = No disability nondiscrimination law in at least one significant category
Arrow symbol (4) indicates column referred to in comment
Alabama 0 0 No disability protection in private employment
Alaska 0
Arizona 0
Arkansas ,.* * Prohibits health care provider discrimination based on HIV test result; usesAr aedel definition minus "regarded as" clause
California * * Prohibits employment discrimination based on HIV test result; no "recordof'" clause t
Colorado , 0 Legislature has declared policy of HIV nondiscrimination
Connecticut 4 State definition of disability broader than federal
Delaware 0 4 State definition of disability broader than federal for employment
District of Columbia 0
Florida 4 0 4 HlV explicitly incorporated in handicap definition; no "regarded as" clause
Georgia 0 4 No coverage of public accommodations, housing, other areas
Guam 4 Uses term "classified as" raier than "regarded as"
Hawaii 4 6 0 IV protected in housing discrimination statute
Idaho S
Illinois I l111. Court of Appeals ruled that HIV is a disability
Indiana State definition of disability broader than federal for housing
Iowa 4 HIV explicitly incorporated in handicap definition
Kansas 4 0 HIV case reporting data may not be used to discriminate
4n k Prohibits housing, public accommodations, public services andKestucky 0= 0 • employment discrimination based on HIV status
Louisiana 0
Maine 0 0 1 Ist Cir. Ct. of Appeals ruled HIV is disability under state law
Maryland 4 0 HIV discrimination by public safety personnel prohibited
Massachusetts
Michigan 0 4 Federal distict court ruled that HIV is protected under state law
Minnesota 0 4 Court of Appeals ruled HIV a disability
Mississippi 0 4 No coverage of private employment and other areas
Missouri 4 S No coverage for "regarded as" HIV infected
Montana 4 0 Health care facilities may not refuse to admit persons with HIV
"DISABILITY" UNDER FEDERAL AND STATE LAW
Nebraska 4 0 Broad protection from discrimination based on IV
Nevada S
Statute prohibits evictions based on having AIDS or being regarded as
New Hampshire ' having AIDS, but not based on HIV
New Jersey 0 4 Superior Ct. ruled persons viewed at risk to develop AIDS covered
New Mexico , 0 WV test results may not be used to discriminate in employment
New York 4 0 State definition of disability broader than federal
North Carolina 0 Statute offers significantly less protection than federal law
North Dakota S
Ohio + • No HIV discrimination in gov't services & gov't-funded services
Oklahoma S
Oregon 0 State definition of disability includes federal definition but is broader
Pennsylvania 0
Puerto Rico 4 Legislatively declared policy of non-discrimeination
Rhode Island 4 S Discrimination based on "positive AIDS test" prohibited
South Carolina 0
South Dakota 0
Tennessee 0
Texas 4 0 0lIV testing for employment purposes prohibited
Utah 0
Vermont 4 0HIV discrimination in public and private employment prohibited
Virgin Islands, US 4 No prohibition against WV discrimination
HIV discrimination by public safety personnel prohibited; no "regarded as"Virginta 4clause
Washington + 0 HIV discrimination in public and private employment prohibited
West Virginia 0 , W. Va. Supreme Ct. has ruled HIV a disability
Wisconsin 4 HIV discrimination by public safety personnel prohibited
Wyoming , "Federal disability" definition adopted by state agency
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APPENDIX B:
STATE HIV DISABILITY LAW COMPILATION
(INCLUDING GUAM, PUERTO RICO, AND
THE U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS) 1
For each state, law summaries are provided in this order: (1) HIV spe-
cific state nondiscrimination laws; (2) HIV testing or information laws;
(3) general disability laws; (4) administrative or judicial interpreta-
tions of significance in regard to coverage of HIV infection. State
agency interpretations and local ordinances have been included
where available.
ALABAMA
Alabama's disability nondiscrimination law prohibits discrimination
against the "physically disabled" in public employment, housing ac-
commodations, and public accommodations. ALA. CODE §§ 21-7-2 to
21-7-9 (1997). "Physically disabled" is not defined by statute.
The Alabama Fair Housing Law incorporates the federal definition of
disability. ALA. CODE § 24-8-3(6) (1992 & Supp. 1999).
Alabama does not have a disability nondiscrimination law applicable
to private employers.
ALASKA
The Alaska Human Rights Law prohibits discrimination in public and
private employment, housing, credit and financing, based on "disabil-
ity," and incorporates the federal definition of disability. AiAsKA
STAT. § 18.80.300(9),(12)-(13) (Lexis Law Publishing 1998).
ARIZONA
The Arizona Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination in public and
private employment and housing on the basis of "handicap." The defi-
nition of handicap incorporates the federal definition of disability.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1461.4 (West Supp. 1999). The housing
nondiscrimination provisions provide that "[h]andicap shall be de-
fined as the term is defined by the Americans with Disabilities Act."
Id. § 14-1491.8.
The Arizonians with Disabilities Act of 1992, ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 41-1492.5 (West Supp. 1999), prohibits discrimination in public ac-
1. The authors acknowledge the research assistance of Deborah Reichmann in
preparing this compilation. Valuable comments on aspects of various local laws were
provided by Ron Boyter, John Davidson, Justin Hayford, and David Schulman.
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commodations and commercial facilities on the basis of disability, and
incorporates the standards of Title III of the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12184 (1994).
ARKANSAS
The Arkansas HIV Shield Law provides that "[h]ealth care providers
or facilities may not deny appropriate care based upon the results of
an HIV test." AR& CODE ANN. § 20-15-905(d) (Lexis Law Publishing
Supp. 1999). The HIV Shield Law does not include any enforcement
provisions.
The Arkansas Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination in public and
private employment, public accommodations, property transactions,
finance and credit, and voting and participation in the political pro-
cess on the basis of "any sensory, mental, or physical disability." "Disa-
bility" is defined as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits a major life function . . . ." ARc. CODE ANN. § 16-123-102(3)
(Michie 1987 & Lexis Law Publishing Supp. 1999).
The Arkansas Fair Housing Act prohibits discrimination in housing
accommodations and real estate transactions on the basis of "disabil-
ity." ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-202 (Michie 1987 & Lexis Law Publish-
ing Supp. 1999). No statutory definition of "disability" is provided.
The Arkansas disability discrimination law prohibits discrimination in
public services, facilities, employment, public accommodations, and
housing accommodations on the basis of "physical handicap." ARF.
CODE ANN. § 20-14-303 (Michie 1991 & Lexis Law Publishing Supp.
1999). No statutory definition of "physical handicap" is provided.
CALIFORNIA
California law prohibits the use of HIV test results for determining
suitability for employment or insurability. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 120980(f) (West 1996). Similarly, participation in an HIV re-
search study may not be used to determine employability or insurabil-
ity of a research subject. Id. § 121115 (West 1996).
California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) prohibits dis-
crimination based on "physical disability," "mental disability," or
"medical condition" in public and private employment. CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 12940 (West Supp. 2000). The definitions for "mental disabil-
ity" and "physical disability" explicitly use the federal definition as a
floor for coverage. Id. § 12926(i), (k) (West Supp. 2000). It further
prohibits discrimination based on "disability" with regard to housing
accommodations. The definition of "disability" incorporates the fed-
20001
JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAw & POLICY
eral definition. Id. § 12955.3, (West Supp. 2000); see also CAL. CODE
REGS. tit. 9, § 7025 (1999).
California's Unruh Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination based on
"disability" in public accommodations or business establishments, as
does the Disabled Persons Act, CAL. Crv. CODE § 54, which incorpo-
rates the federal definition of disability. A violation of the ADA is
deemed a violation of these state laws. Id. § 51, 54 (West Supp. 2000).
California law prohibits discrimination against individuals with disabil-
ities, as defined by federal law, in programs or activities receiving fi-
nancial assistance from the state. CAL. GoV'T CODE § 11135 (West
1992 & Supp. 1998).
COLORADO
Colorado's Anti-Discrimination Act prohibits discrimination in public
and private employment, housing, and public accommodation on the
basis of "disability." The definition of "disability" incorporates the fed-
eral definition. CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-301 (West 1990 &
Supp. 1999).
The Colorado legislature has issued a legislative declaration that "hav-
ing... HIV infection, being presumed to have the HIV infection, or
seeking testing for the presence of such infection should not serve as
the basis for discriminatory actions or the prevention of access to serv-
ices." COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-4-1401 (West Supp. 1999). No en-
forcement provisions are included in this provision.
In Phelps v. Field Real Estate Co., 793 F. Supp. 1535, 1544 (D. Colo.
1991), affd 991 F.2d 645, 650 (10th Cir. 1993), the defendant con-
ceded that HIV infection is a disability under Colorado law.
CONNECTICUT
The Connecticut Human Rights and Opportunities Act prohibits
"physical disability" discrimination in public and private employment,
housing, public accommodations, and other areas. "Physical disabil-
ity" is defined as "chronic physical handicap, infirmity or impairment,
whether congenital or... from illness . . . ." CoNm. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 46a-51(15) (West 1995 and Supp. 1999).
Conn. Agencies Regs. § 46a-54-57 (1999) (authorizes use of pseudo-
nym for complaints referring to confidential HIV information); Id.
§ 46a-54-41 (standards for the collection, use, maintenance, and re-
lease of confidential HIV-related information).
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DELAWARE
The Delaware Handicapped Persons Employment Protections Act
(DHPEPA) prohibits discrimination in public and private employ-
ment and incorporates the federal definition of disability, but defines
"substantially limits" to mean that the "impairment so affects a person
as to create a likelihood that such person will experience difficulty in
securing, retaining or advancing in employment because of a handi-
cap." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 722(4) (1995). The definition of "re-
garded as having an impairment" includes "a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits major life activities because of the
attitudes of others." Id. The DHPEPA further provides that the "re-
garded as" having an impairment provision "is intended to be inter-
preted in conformity with the federal Rehabilitation Act." Id.
The Delaware Fair Housing Act incorporates the federal definition of
disability. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4602(14) (1999).
The Delaware Equal Accommodations Law incorporates the federal
definition. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4502(8) (1999).
The Delaware Department of Insurance has issued regulations to pre-
vent discrimination against potential insureds by life and health insur-
ers when phrasing questions or requiring tests relating to AIDS. DEL.
REGS. § 56-1 to 56-5 (1999).
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
The District of Columbia Human Rights Act prohibits discrimination
in public and private employment, public accommodations, housing,
education, real estate transactions, and the sale of motor vehicle insur-
ance on the basis of "disability." "Disability" incorporates the federal
definition of disability. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2502(5A) (1992 & Supp.
1997).
Policy Statement, D.C. Office of Human Rights, 8A Lab. Rel. Rep.
(BNA) 453:1715 (Oct. 9, 1986).
FLORIDA
The Florida Civil Rights Act provides that "[a]ny person with or per-
ceived as having acquired immune deficiency syndrome, acquired im-
mune deficiency syndrome related complex, or human
immunodeficiency virus shall have every protection made available to
handicapped persons." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.50(2) (West 1997).
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The Florida Civil Rights Act, prohibits discrimination in public and
private employment the basis of handicap. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 760.01-
760.11, 509.092 (West 1997 & Supp. 1998).
The Florida Fair Housing Act prohibits housing discrimination on the
basis of handicap. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.20-760.37 (West 1997 &
Supp. 1998).
The Florida Educational Equity Act, prohibits discrimination against
students and employees on the basis of handicap. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 228.2001(2) (West 1998).
However, public accommodation, housing accommodations, and pub-
lic employment nondiscrimination rights are granted to the "physi-
cally disabled," which is defined as "any person having a physical
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities."
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 413.08 (6) (a) (West 1998).
Persons or entities receiving state financial assistance may not discrim-
inate against an otherwise qualified individual in housing, public ac-
commodations, or government services on the basis that the
individual is "infected with human immunodeficiency virus." FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 760.50(4)(b) (West 1997).
Florida prohibits the use of HIV testing as a condition of employment
and prohibits discrimination against any individual on the basis of
"knowledge or belief that the individual has taken an [HIV] test or the
results or perceived results of such test." FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 760.50(3)(b) (West 1997 and Supp. 1998).
Florida courts are prohibited from denying shared parental responsi-
bility, custody, or visitation rights to a parent or grandparent solely
because the parent or grandparent "is or is believed to be infected
with human immunodeficiency virus." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(6)
(West 1997 & Supp. 1998).
GEORGIA
The Georgia Equal Employment for Persons with Disabilities Code
prohibits discrimination in public and private employment on the ba-
sis of "disability." "Disability" incorporates the federal definition. GA.
CODE ANN. § 34-6A-2 (1998). Nondiscrimination provisions do not ap-
ply to an applicant for employment who has "any communicable dis-
ease, either carried by or afflicting an applicant." Id. § 34-6A-3(b) (2).
Georgia does not have a nondiscrimination statute covering public ac-
commodations, housing, or other areas.
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GUAM
The Guam Employment Relations Act prohibits discrimination in
public and private employment on the basis of "disability." Disability
incorporates the federal definition and includes "physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits major life activities only as a result
of the attitudes of others as having such an impairment." 22 GUAM
CODE ANN. § 5202(b) (4) (1998).
HAWAII
The Hawaii Confidentiality of HIV Information Act prohibits the com-
pelled release of HIV test results or disclosure of HIV testing "in order
to obtain or maintain housing, employment, or education." HAw.
REv. STAT. § 325-101(c) (1996 & Supp. 1999).
The Hawaii housing nondiscrimination provisions prohibit discrimi-
nation on the basis of "HIV (human immunodeficiency virus) infec-
tion" and bar inquiries as to whether an individual has been tested for
HIV. HAw. REv. STAT. § 515-3 (1993 & Supp. 1999). The statute also
incorporates the federal definition of disability. Id. § 515-2.
The Hawaii Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination in employment,
housing, access to state services and public accommodations on the
basis of "disability." The definition of disability incorporates the fed-
eral definition. HAw. REV. STAT. § 368-1.5(b) (1999).
IDAHO
The Idaho Commission on Human Rights Act prohibits discrimina-
tion in public and private employment and real estate transactions
and financing on the basis of "disability." The statutory definition of
"disability" incorporates the federal definition although "substantial
limitation" is not specified as being imposed on a major life activity.
IDAHO CODE § 67-5902(15) (1995). Associational discrimination is
prohibited in real property transactions. Id. § 67-5909 (1995).
ILLINOIS
The Illinois Human Rights Act prohibits discrimination in public and
private employment, housing, credit and financing, and public ac-
commodations on the basis of "handicap," which is defined as a "de-
terminable physical or mental characteristic of a person... the history
of such characteristic, or the perception of such characteristic by the
person complained against, which may result from disease .... ." 775
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-103(I) (West 1993 & Supp. 1999). See also
Illinois Interpretative Rules on Handicap Discrimination in Employ-
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ment, Ill. Admin. Code tit. 56, § 2500. For purposes of employment,
the characteristic must be unrelated to the person's ability to perform
the duties of a particularjob or position; for purposes of housing, the
characteristic must be unrelated to the person's ability to acquire, rent
or maintain a housing accommodation; for purposes of credit unre-
lated to a person's ability to repay and public accommodations, must
be unrelated to the person's ability to utilize and benefit from a place
of public accommodation.
In Raintree Health Care Center v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n, 672
N.E.2d 1136, 1141 (Ill. 1996), affg 655 N.E.2d 944 (Ill. Ct. App. 1995),
the Illinois Supreme Court held that HIV infection, because it is "a
determinable physical characteristic resulting from a disease," is a
handicap with the meaning of the Illinois Human Rights Act.
INDIANA
The Indiana Civil Rights Law prohibits discrimination in public and
private employment, housing, public accommodations, and education
based on "disability." "Disability" is defined as "the physical or mental
condition of a person that constitutes a substantial disability." IND.
CODE ANN. § 22-9-1-3(r) (West 1997).
The Indiana Equal Access to Housing for Persons with Disabilities Law
defines "individual with a disability" as "an individual who, by reason
of physical or mental defect or infirmity, whether congenital or ac-
quired by accident, injury, or disease, is or may subsequently be totally
or partially prevented from achieving the fullest attainable, physical,
social, economic, mental and vocational participation in the normal
process of living." IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9-6 (West 1997).
IOWA
The Iowa Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination in public and pri-
vate employment, housing, and public accommodations on the basis
of disability, which is defined to include "the condition of a person
with a positive human immunodeficiency virus test result, a diagnosis
of [AIDS], a diagnosis of [ARC], or any other condition related to
[AIDS]." IOWA CODE ANN. § 216.2 (West 1994 & Supp. 2000). The
inclusion positive HIV test results within the definition of disability is
explicitly noted "not to preclude" the inclusion of other "conditions
resulting from other contagious or infectious diseases" from that defi-
nition. Id.
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KANSAS
The Kansas Act Against Discrimination prohibits discrimination in
public and private employment, public accommodations and services,
and housing on the basis of "disability." "Disability" incorporates the
federal definition. KAN. STAT. ANN § 44-1002 (1993).
The Kansas H1V reporting statute provides that "[i]nformation re-
garding... HIV infection reported [for epidemiological purposes by
physicians and laboratory directors to the state secretary of health]
shall 'not be used in any form or manner which would lead to the
discrimination against any individual or group with regard to employ-
ment, to provision of medical care or acceptance into facilities or insti-
tutions for medical care, housing, education, transportation, or for
the provision of any other goods or services." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-
6004(d) (Supp. 1998).
KENTUCKY
The Kentucky Equal Opportunities Act provides that "any person with
[AIDS], [ARC], or human immunodeficiency virus shall have every
protection made available to individuals with disabilities under [the
employment nondiscrimination provisions of Kentucky Revised Stat-
utes §§] 207.130 to 207.240 and Section 504 [of] the Rehabilitation
Act. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 207.135(1) (Banks-Baldwin 1997). HIV
testing is prohibited in pre-employment examinations and for current
employees, unless HIV status is a bona fide occupational qualification.
Id. § 207.135(2) (a) (Banks-Baldwin 1997). An employer asserting
HIV as a bona fide occupational qualification must prove that the test
is "necessary to ascertain whether an employee is currently able to per-
form in a reasonable manner the duties of the particular job or
whether the employee will present a significant risk of transmitting
human immunodeficiency virus infection to other persons in the
course of normal work activities." Additionally, the employer bears
the burden of proving that there exists "no means of reasonable ac-
commodation short of requiring the test." Id. § 207.135(2) (b). Em-
ployers may make pre-employment inquiries concerning the existence
of an applicant's disability and about the extent to which that disabil-
ity has been overcome by treatment or medication. Id. § 207.140(1).
Nondiscrimination protections do not apply in the case of applicants
for employment or housing who have "any communicable disease."
Discrimination based on HIV infection, or perception of infection, is
prohibited in housing, public accommodations, and governmental
services. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 207.135(3)(a)-(b) (Banks-Baldwin
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1997). Entities receiving state financial assistance are also prohibited
from discriminating on the basis of HIV infection or the perception of
HIV infection. Id.
Licensed health care professionals who treat patients with HIV are
also protected from discrimination. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 207.135(3) (d) (Banks-Baldwin 1997).
LOUISIANA
The Louisiana Civil Rights Act for Handicapped Persons prohibits dis-
crimination in employment, education, housing, and public services
on the basis of "handicap." "Handicap" incorporates the federal defi-
nition of disability. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-2253(1) (West 1999).
MAINE
Maine law (Ch. 501, Medical Conditions), provides that employees or
applicants for employment may not be required to submit to HIV test-
ing or to reveal whether they have been tested for HIV, except when
based on a bona fide occupational qualification. This provision is en-
forced by the Maine Human Rights Commission. ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 5, § 19204-B (West Supp. 1999).
The Maine Human Rights Act prohibits discrimination in public and
private employment, housing, public accommodations, financing, and
education on the basis of "physical or mental disability." "Disability" is
defined as "physical or mental condition of a person that constitutes a
substantial disability as determined by a physician.. ." ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 5, § 4553 (West Supp. 1999) (definition 7-A).
As noted in Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934 (1st Cir. 1997), the concept
of disability under the Maine Human Rights Act is co-extensive with
that of the Americans with Disabilities Act.
MARYLAND
Maryland's HIV informed consent testing statute provides that refusal
to undergo HIV testing may not be used "as the sole basis by any insti-
tution or laboratory to deny services or treatment." MD. CODE ANN.,
HEALTH-GEN. § 18-336(c) (Supp. 1999).
Maryland's statute providing for disclosure of HIV information to fire
fighters, emergency medical technicians, rescue squadpersons, law en-
forcement officers, and correctional officers provides that individuals
in those occupations "may not refuse to treat or transport an individ-
ual because the individual is HIV positive." MD. CODE ANN., HEALTI-
GEN. § 18-213(m) (Supp. 1999). Similarly, with regard to the transpor-
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tation of HIV positive decedents, the same standard applies to correc-
tional officers, first responders, law enforcement officers, medical care
facilities, and physicians performing postmortem exams. Id. § 18-
213.2(h) (Supp. 1999).
The Maryland Human Rights Act prohibits discrimination in public
and private employment, housing, public accommodations, retail serv-
ices, and by persons licensed or regulated by the State Department of
Licensing and Regulations on the basis of physical or mental handi-
cap, or perceived handicap, which is defined as "any physical disability
... which is caused by ... illness .... " MD. ANN. CODE, art. 49B,
§ 15 (g) (1998 & Supp. 1999).
The Maryland Commission on Human Relations has interpreted the
statutory definition as including "infection with Human Immu-
nodeficiency Virus." MD. REGS. CODE tit. 14, § 14.03.02.02 (1999). In
its interpretation of the Act, the Commission incorporated the federal
definition of disability, including the "perceived-as" disabled element.
Id. § 14.03.02.03.
Discrimination against public school teachers on basis of "handicap"
is prohibited. MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 6-104 (1999). "Handicap" is
not defined.
Discrimination insurance not allowed for disability unless actuarially
justified. MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 27-208 (1997 & Supp. 1999).
MASSACHUSETTS
The Massachusetts Unlawful Discrimination Law prohibits discrimina-
tion in public and private employment and real estate transactions on
the basis of "handicap." "Handicap" incorporates the federal defini-
tion of disability. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 151B, § 1 (West 1998 &
Supp. 2000).
MICHIGAN
The Michigan Handicappers' Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination
in public and private employment, public accommodations, public
services, housing and real estate, and educational facilities for handi-
capped individuals. "Handicap" incorporates the federal definition,
but instead of impairment, the statute uses the term "determinable
physical or mental characteristic of an individual, which may result
from disease, injury, congenital condition of birth, or functional disor-
der." MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 37.1103(d) (West Supp. 1999).
In Robinson v. Henry Ford Health Systems, 892 F. Supp. 176, 180 (E.D.
Mich. 1994), affd without opinion, 86 F.3d 1156 (6th Cir. 1996), the
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court noted that persons "who have tested positive for AIDS or the
AIDS-related HIV virus are covered as handicapped or disabled indi-
viduals under both the Michigan and federal [Rehabilitation] acts."
MINNESOTA
The Minnesota Human Rights Act prohibits discrimination in public
and private employment, public accommodations, housing, public
services, and education on the basis of "disability." MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 363.01 (West 1991 & Supp. 2000). The statutory definition of "disa-
bility" incorporates the federal definition, although impairment may
be "physical, sensory, or mental" and the limitation on one or more
major life activities must be "material." Id.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals interpreted this provision to apply to
asymptomatic HIV infection in Beaulieu v. Clausen, 491 N.W.2d 662
(Minn. Ct. App. 1992), on the basis that individuals with HIV are ma-
terially limited in several major life activities, including social partici-
pation (because of emotional problems as well as ostracism), sexual
activities, child-bearing, access to insurance coverage, and limitations
on career choices involving extensive training resulting from limited
life expectancy, and limitations on ability to work due to need for
medical care.
MISSISSIPPI
Mississippi's employment law prohibits discrimination in public em-
ployment and by employers receiving state funding on the basis of
"handicap." There is no statutory definition of "handicap." Miss.
CODE ANN. § 25-9-149 (1999).
Mississippi does not have a nondiscrimination law covering private
employment or other areas.
MISSOURI
The Missouri HIV and Public Health Act provides that the Missouri
Human Rights Act, Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 213.010-213.137 (West 1996 &
Supp. 1998), "shall apply to individuals with HIV infection ... ." Id.
§ 191.665 (West 1996).
The Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA) prohibits discrimination in
employment, public accommodations, housing, and commercial real
estate loans on the basis of "disability." The statutory definition of
"disability" incorporates the federal definition. Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 213.010(10) (West Supp. 2000). The MHRA also includes "associa-
tional" discrimination. Id. § 213.070(4) (West 1996 & Supp. 2000).
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MONTANA
The Montana Hospitals and Related Facilities Law provides that "a
health care facility may not refuse to admit a person to the facility
solely because the person has an HIV-related condition." "HIV-re-
lated condition" means "any medical condition resulting from an HIV
infection, including but not limited to seropositivity for HIV." MONT.
CODE ANN. § 50-5-105(2) (2000).
The Montana Human Rights Act prohibits discrimination in public
and private employment, public accommodations, education, and
housing on the basis of "disability." "Disability" incorporates the fed-
eral definition. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-101(19) (1997).
NEBRASKA
The Nebraska Individual Rights Act prohibits discrimination in public
and private employment, housing, education, and public accommoda-
tions on the basis that the individual discriminated against "is suffer-
ing or is suspected of suffering from human immunodeficiency virus
infection or acquired immunodeficiency syndrome." NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 20-168 (1997). Each agency of the state government was required to
"examine policies and practices within its jurisdiction that may inten-
tionally or unintentionally result in discrimination against a person
who has taken a [HIV] antibody or antigen test or who has been diag-
nosed as having [AIDS] or [ARC] to ascertain the extent and types of
discrimination that may exist," and to report its findings to the state
legislature by December 1, 1988. Id. § 20-167.
The Nebraska Fair Employment Practice Act prohibits discrimination
in public and private employment on the basis of "disability." "Disabil-
ity" incorporates the federal definition. NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-1102(9)
(1993).
NEVADA
The Nevada Equal Opportunity for Employment Law prohibits dis-
crimination in public and private employment on the basis of "disabil-
ity." "Disability" incorporates the federal definition. NEV. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 613.310(1) (Michie 1996).
The Nevada Fair Housing Law prohibits discrimination in housing on
the basis of "disability." "Disability" incorporates the federal defini-
tion. NEV. RiEv. STAT. ANN. § 118.045 (Michie 1998).
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NEW HAMPSHIRE
The New Hampshire Law Against Discrimination prohibits discrimina-
tion in public and private employment, housing, and public accom-
modations on the basis of "physical or mental disability." "Disability"
incorporates the federal definition. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 354-
A:2.IV (1995).
Landlords are prohibited from evicting a tenant "solely on the
grounds that the person has [AIDS] or is regarded to have [AIDS]."
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:10.VI (1995 & Supp. 1999).
NEW JERSEY
The New Jersey Law Against Discrimination prohibits discrimination
in public and private employment, public accommodations and facili-
ties (including public and private schools), public and private hous-
ing, real estate transactions on the basis of "handicap," which includes
"AIDS or HIV infection." N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-4.1 and 10:5-5(q)
(West 1993 & Supp. 1999). "HIV infection" is defined as "infection
with the human immunodeficiency virus or any other related virus
identified as a probable causative agent of AIDS." Id. § 10:5-5(gg).
Announcement, N.J. Div. Civ. Rights, Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH)
5026 (July 1986) (AIDS discrimination and testing for AIDS prohib-
ited). Associational discrimination is prohibited in housing. N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 10:5-4.1 (West 1993).
In Poff v. Caro, 549 A.2d 900, 903 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987), the
court ruled that New Jersey law prohibits housing discrimination
based on the perception that an individual has AIDS or the "poten-
tial" to develop AIDS, noting that there is no rational basis for distin-
guishing between those with a disability and those so perceived.
NEW MEXICO
New Mexico's Human Immunodeficiency Virus Related Test Limita-
tion Law prohibits employers from requiring disclosure of HIV-related
test results for purposes of hiring, promotion, or continued employ-
ment. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-IOA-1 (Michie 1996).
New Mexico's Human Rights Act prohibits discrimination in public
and private employment, housing, and public accommodations on the
basis of "physical or mental handicap" or "serious medical condition."
"Handicap" incorporates the federal definition of disability. N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1-2.M, 28-1-7.A (Michie 1996).
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NEW YORK
The New York Human Rights Law prohibits discrimination in public
and private employment, public accommodations, housing, and fi-
nancing based on "disability." "Disability" is defined as a "physical,
mental or medical impairment resulting from anatomical, physiologi-
cal, genetic or neurological conditions which prevents the exercise of
a normal bodily function or is demonstrable by medically accepted
clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques," or a record such an im-
pairment, or a condition regarded by others as such an impairment.
N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 292(21) (McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1998). This provi-
sion has been interpreted by the New York Division on Human Rights
to include HIV infection. Policy Statement, N.Y. Div. Human Rights,
8A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 455:3081 (Dec. 1985).
Petri v. Bank of N.Y. Co., 582 N.Y.S.2d 608, 611 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1992) (asymptomatic HIV infection, whether actual or perceived, is
disability under New York law).
Seitzman v. Hudson River Assocs., 542 N.Y.S.2d 104 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1989) (successful discrimination claim under New York law of
physician-tenant whose practice included patients with AIDS).
NORTH CAROLINA
The North Carolina Communicable Disease Act (NCCDA) prohibits
discrimination in continued employment, housing, public services,
public accommodations, and public transportation against "any per-
son having AIDS virus or HIV infection on account of that infec-
tion[.]" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-148(i) (1999). The NCCDA also
prohibits the use or requirement of HIV testing to determine suitabil-
ity for continued employment, housing, public services, public accom-
modations, and public transportation. Id. However, the NCCDA
allows licensed health care providers and facilities to discriminate
against patients with HIV infection "to protect the health care pro-
vider or employees of the provider or employees of the facility while
providing appropriate care" and to refer the patient with HIV to an-
other provider or facility "when such referral is for the purpose of
providing more appropriate treatment." Id. § 130A-148(j) (1999).
The North Carolina Persons With Disabilities Act (NCPDA) prohibits
discrimination in employment, public accommodations, public serv-
ices, and public transportation on the basis of handicap. The NCPDA
incorporates the federal definition of disability, N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 168A-3(7a) & (7b) (1999). However, the NCPDA allows HIV testing
of job applicants, denial of employment to job applicants based on
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HIV status, and HIV testing as an annual medical examination rou-
tinely required of all employees by the employer. Reassignment or ter-
mination of employment is allowed if the employee poses a significant
risk to the employee or others, or if the employee is unable to per-
form the normally assigned duties of the job. Does not include "work-
ing" among the activities identified as major life activities. Id. § 168A-
5(b).
In Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, Inc., 388 S.E.2d 134 (N.C. 1990), the
Supreme Court of North Carolina interpreted the North Carolina stat-
ute (then titled the North Carolina Handicapped Persons Protection
Act) as not applying to HIV infection because (1) the statute ex-
empted "communicable diseases" from the definition of handicap and
(2) HIV did not limit a major life activity as defined by the act. At the
time of the Burgess decision, the North Carolina statute did not in-
clude working as a "major life activity."
The North Carolina Handicapped Persons Act prohibits discrimina-
tion in public accommodations and conveyances, and housing, on the
basis of "handicap." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168A (1999). The Act has been
construed to be limited to a present, non-correctable loss of function
that substantially limits a person's ability to function normally. See
Pressman v. University of North Carolina, 337 S.E.2d 644, 649 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1985).
NORTH DAKOTA
The North Dakota Human Rights Act prohibits discrimination in pub-
lic and private employment, housing, property rights, public services,
credit transactions, and public accommodations on the basis of "disa-
bility." "Disability" incorporates the federal definition. N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-02.4-02 (1997).
OHIO
The Ohio AIDS and HIV Programs Law provides that disclosure of
HIV test results to health care providers "may not be requested or
made solely for the purpose of identifying an individual who has a
positive HIV test result ... in order to refuse to treat the individual."
OHIO REv. CODE Ann. § 3701.24.3(B) (2) (Anderson 1999). The Ohio
AIDS and HIV Programs Law also provides that "no [governmental
agency] or private nonprofit corporation receiving state or local gov-
ernment funds shall refuse to admit as a patient, or to provide services
to, any individual solely because he refuses to consent to an HIV test
or to disclose HIV test results." Id. § 3701.24.5(A).
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The Ohio Civil Rights Commission Act prohibits discrimination in
public and private employment, housing, public accommodations,
and granting of credit on the basis of "handicap." The statute incorpo-
rates the federal definition of disability (setting forth as major life ac-
tivities the "functions of caring for one's self, performing manual
tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and
working."). OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.01(13) (Anderson 1999).
"Physical or mental impairment" includes "human immunodeficiency
virus infection." Id. § 4112.01 (16) (a) (iii).
The Ohio Civil Rights Commission has interpreted this law as cover-
ing HIV infection. Policy Statement, Ohio Civ. Rights Comm'n, 8A
Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 457:275 (Mar. 25, 1987); see also Lawson v. E.R.
Towers Co., No. B3112385(13570)-052086 (Ohio Civ. Rights Comm'n,
Nov. 14, 1986), summarized in 8 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 421:678.
Ohio Civil Rights Commission regulations include "perceived as"
handicapped within the definition. Ohio Admin. Code § 4112-5-
02(H) (1997). See also Cleveland v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 648
N.E.2d 516 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).
OKLAHOMA
The Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act prohibits discrimination in
public and private employment, public accommodations, and housing
on the basis of handicap. Handicap incorporates the federal defini-
tion of disability. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1301(4) (West 1999).
OREGON
The Oregon Civil Rights of Disabled Persons Act prohibits discrimina-
tion in public and private employment, housing, and public accom-
modations on the basis of "disability." "Disability" generally
incorporates the federal definition, but defines "major life activity" as
including but not limited to "self-care, ambulation, communication,
transportation, education, socialization, employment and the ability
to acquire, rent or maintain property." OR. REV. STAT.
§ 659.400(2) (a) (1996). "Substantially limits" means that the "impair-
ment renders the person unable to perform a major life activity that
the average person in the general population can perform . . . or...
significantly restricts the condition, manner or duration under which
an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared
to the condition, manner or duration under which the average person
in the general population can perform the same major life activity."
Id. § 659.400(2) (d).
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PENNSYLVANIA
The Pennsylvania Human Relations Act covers handicap discrimina-
tion, including discrimination on basis of perceived handicap, in em-
ployment, housing, and public accommodations on the basis of
"handicap or disability." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 954-955 (1999).
"Handicap or disability" incorporates the federal definition of disabil-
ity. Id. § 954(p.1).
Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission regulations provide that a
handicap or disability which is not job-related but which may worsen
and become job related is covered, subject to the defense of undue
hardship. PA. CODE tit. 16, § 44.15 (1998).
The Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission has interpreted the
Act to cover AIDS/ARC/HIV. Policy Statement, Pa. Hum. Relations
Comm'n, Apr. 10, 1986.
PUERTO RICO
Puerto Rico has enacted a law for the prohibition of all discrimination
against persons diagnosed with HIV or AIDS. P.R LAws ANN. tit. 1
§ 521 (1998). The Puerto Rico Discrimination Against Disabled Per-
sons Act prohibits discrimination in public and private employment,
access to the physical facilities of public and private entities, public
and private education, and by Commonwealth-funded private or pub-
lic institutions on the basis of physical or mental disabilities. Id.
§§ 502-508 (Supp. 1997). Disability is defined as "a temporary or per-
manent condition of a motor or mental nature which hinders or limits
[an individual's] inception or ability to work, study or enjoy life fully."
Id. § 501 (d).
RHODE ISLAND
The Rhode Island Prevention and Suppression of Contagious Disease
Act prohibits discrimination in employment, housing, granting of
credit, public accommodation, or delivery of services on the basis of "a
positive AIDS test result, or perception of same .. . ." R.I. GEN. LAWS
§§ 23-6-22 (1996). The Act also prohibits the requirement of an "AIDS
test" as a condition of employment, "except where nondiscrimination
can be shown, on the testimony of competent medical authorities, to
constitute a clear and present danger of AIDS virus transmission to
others." Id.
The Rhode Island Civil Rights of People with Disabilities Act prohibits
discrimination employment, housing, and public accommodations on
the basis of "disability." R.I. GEN. LAws § 42-87-1 (b)-(c) (Supp. 1999).
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The Act incorporates the federal definition of disability and cross-ref-
erences the federal Rehabilitation Act and Americans with Disabilities
Act for its definition of prohibited, discriminatory acts or conduct.
The Rhode Island Equal Opportunity and Affirmative Action Act pro-
hibits discrimination in public and private employment on the basis of
"disability." "Disability" incorporates the federal definition and pro-
vides that the definition "shall include any disability which is provided
protection under the [ADA] and federal regulations pertaining to the
[ADA]$" citing 28 C.F.R. pt. 35 and 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630. R.I. GEN. LAws
§ 28-5-6(9) (Supp. 1999).
The Rhode Island Equal Opportunity and Affirmative Action Act pro-
hibits discrimination in public employment, services, facilities, and ed-
ucational programs on the basis of "disability." R.I. GEN. LAws § 28-
5.1-1 (1995 & Supp. 1999). "Disability" is not defined.
The Rhode Island Fair Housing Practices Act prohibits discrimination
in housing on the basis of disability. R.I. GEN. LAws § 34-37-3(5), (9)
(Supp. 1997).
SOUTH CAROLINA
The South Carolina Human Affairs Law prohibits discrimination in
public and private employment on the basis of "disability." "Disability"
incorporates the federal definition and provides that the term "must
be interpreted in a manner consistent with federal regulations
promulgated pursuant to the [ADA]." S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-13-30
(West Supp. 1999).
The South Carolina Bill of Rights for Handicapped Persons prohibits
discrimination in public accommodations, public services, and hous-
ing on the basis of "handicap." "Handicap" is defined as "a substantial
physical or mental impairment.., acquired by... disease, where the
impairment is verified by medical findings and appears reasonably
certain to continue throughout the lifetime of the individual without
substantial improvement." Id. § 43-33-560 (West Supp. 1999). The
definition also excludes individuals who are only regarded as handi-
capped. The definition of "handicapped person" for purposes of
South Carolina law incorporates the federal definition and "any other
definition prescribed by federal law or regulation for use by agencies
of state government which serve handicapped persons." Id. § 2-7-35
(1986).
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SOUTH DAKOTA
The South Dakota Human Rights Act Law prohibits discrimination in
public and private employment, housing, public accommodations,
and education on the basis of "disability." "Disability" incorporates the
federal definition. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-13-1 (Michie 1995).
TENNESSEE
The Tennessee Human Rights Act prohibits discrimination in public
and private employment, public accommodations, and housingon the
basis of "handicap." "Handicap" incorporates the federal definition of
disability. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-102(9) (A) (1998).
TEXAS
The Texas Communicable Disease Prevention and Control Act pro-
hibits HIV testing for employment purposes, unless the employer can
show that HIV status is a bona fide occupational qualification and
there is not a less discriminatory means of satisfying the occupational
qualification. TEX. CODE HEALTH & SAFETY ANN. § 81.102 (a) (4) (A)
(West 1992). This provision applies to home collection kits for HLV
testing. Id. § 85.253(c) (West Supp. 2000).
The Texas HIV Service Act provides that the results of HIV testing
conducted by a health department voluntary HIV testing program
"may not be used for insurance purposes, to screen to determine suit-
ability for employment, or to discharge a person from employment."
TEX. CODE HEALTH & SAFETY ANN. § 82.082(c) (West 1992).
The Texas Commission on Human Rights Act prohibits discrimina-
tion in public and private employment based on "disability" and incor-
porates the federal definition of disability. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN.
§ 21.002(6) (West Supp. 2000).
The Texas Rights and Responsibilities of Persons with Disabilities Act
prohibits discrimination in housing accommodations and public facil-
ities based on "disability." TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 121.001-
121.011 (West Supp. 2000). "Disability" is defined as a "mental or
physical disability, including mental retardation, hearing impairment,
deafness, speech impairment, visual impairment, or any health im-
pairment that requires special ambulatory devices or services." Id.
§ 121.002(4).
UTAH
The Utah Anti-Discrimination Act prohibits discrimination in public
and private employment on the basis of "handicap." "Handicap" in-
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corporates the federal definition of disability. UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 34A-5-102 (1997).
The Utah Fair Housing Act prohibits discrimination in housing on the
basis of "disability." "Disability" incorporates the federal definition.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-21-2(9)(a) (1997).
VERMONT
The Vermont Fair Employment Practice Act prohibits discrimination
in public and private employment on the basis of "a person's having a
positive test result from an HIV-related blood test." VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, § 495(a)(6) (1999).
The Vermont Discrimination Law prohibits discrimination in public
accommodations and housing on the basis of "disability." "Disability"
incorporates the federal definition. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4501
(1997).
VIRGIN ISLANDS, U.S.
The Virgin Islands Civil Rights Act does not include HIV or other disa-
bility nondiscrimination provisions. V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1-10, 61-
75 (1982 & Supp. 1998).
VIRGINIA
The Virginia Disease Prevention and Control Act provides that "[n] o
person known or suspected to be positive for infection with . . .
human immunodeficiency virus shall be refused services for that rea-
son by any public safety agency personnel." Public safety agencies in-
clude the sheriffs office, adult or youth correctional, law
enforcement, and fire safety organizations, or any governmental
agency or department that employs persons who have law enforce-
ment authority. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-45.2 (Michie 1997).
The Virginians with Disabilities Act prohibits discrimination in public
and private employment, education, public accommodations, and
housing on the basis of "disability." "Disability" incorporates the fed-
eral definition. VA. CODE ANN. § 51.5-3 (Michie 1997).
The Virginia Human Rights Act (VHRA) prohibits conduct "which vi-
olates any Virginia or federal statute or regulation governing discrimi-
nation on the basis of... disability." VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-716 (Michie
Supp. 1999). Nothing in the VHRA "shall be deemed to . .. expand
upon any of the provisions of any other state or federal law relating to
discrimination because of ... disability." Id. § 2.1-717.
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WASHINGTON
The Washington Law Against Discrimination prohibits discrimination
in public and private employment on the basis of "HIV infection" (ac-
tual or perceived), including requiring HIV testing as a condition of
employment, unless absence of HIV infection is bona fide occupa-
tional qualification. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 49.60.172 (West 1990 &
Supp. 1997). Absence of HIV infection as a bona fide occupational
qualification exists "when performance of a particular job can be
shown to present a significant risk, as defined by the board of health
by rule, of transmitting HIV infection to other persons, and there ex-
ists no means of eliminating the risk by restructuring the job." Id.
§ 49.60.172(3). Claims of actual or perceived HIV discrimination are
to be "evaluated in the same manner" as other claims of disability dis-
crimination. Id. § 49.60.174(1).
The Washington Law Against Discrimination prohibits discrimination
in public and private employment, public accommodations, housing
and real estate transactions, and financing and credit transactions on
the basis of "sensory, mental or physical disability." WASH. REv. CODE
ANN. § 49.60.010 (West Supp. 1997). No definition of disability is
provided.
WEST VIRGINIA
The West Virginia Human Rights Act (WVHRA) prohibits discrimina-
tion in employment, public accommodations, and housing on the ba-
sis of "disability." "Disability" incorporates the federal definition of
disability. W. VA. CODE § 5-11-3(m) (1999).
In Benjamin R. v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 390 S.E.2d 814, 818 (W. Va.
1990), the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals ruled that HIV
infection is a handicap under the WVHRA on the basis that HIV infec-
tion substantially impairs or limits the major life activity of "socializa-
tion" because of the psychological impact resulting from knowledge of
one's HIV status; the WVHRA was subsequently amended to conform
more precisely to federal law.
WISCONSIN
The Wisconsin Communicable Disease Control Law prohibits health
care providers, peace officers, fire fighters, correctional officers, state
patrol officers, jailers, home health agencies, and inpatient health
care facilities from discriminating against an individual who has "a
positive test for the presence of HIV, antigen or nonantigenic prod-
ucts of HIV or an antibody to HIV, solely because the individual has
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HIV infection or an illness or medical condition that is caused by,
arises from or is related to HIV infection." Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 252.14(2) (West Supp. 1999).
The Wisconsin Fair Employment Act prohibits discrimination in pub-
lic and private employment on the basis of "disability." "Disability"
incorporates the federal definition of disability. Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 111.31-32 (West 1997 & Supp. 1999).
WYOMING
The Wyoming Fair Employment Practices Act prohibits discrimination
in public and private employment on the basis of "handicap." The
statute provides no definition for handicap. Wyo. STAT. § 27-9-105
(1999). The Wyoming Fair Employment Commission Rules of Prac-
tice incorporate the federal definition of disability.
